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Abstract
Resilience of systems to failures during functioning is of great practical impor-
tance. One of the strategies that might be considered to enhance reliability and
resilience of a system is swapping components when a component fails, thus replac-
ing it by another component from the system that is still functioning. This thesis
studies this scenario, particularly with the use of the survival signature concept to
quantify system reliability, where it is assumed that such a swap of components re-
quires these components to be of the same type. We examine the effect of swapping
components on a reliability importance measure for the specific components, and
we also consider the joint reliability importance of two components. Such swapping
of components may be an attractive means toward more resilient systems and could
be an alternative to adding more components to achieve redundancy of repair and
replacement activities.
Swapping components, if possible, is likely to incur some costs, for example for
the actual swap or to prepare components to be able to take over functionality of an-
other component. In this thesis we also consider the cost effectiveness of component
swapping over a fixed period of time. It is assumed that a system needs to function
for a given period of time, where failure to achieve this incurs a penalty cost. The
expected costs when the different swap scenarios are applicable are compared with
the option not to enable swaps. We also study the cost effectiveness of component
swapping over an unlimited time horizon from the perspective of renewal theory.
We assume that the system is entirely renewed upon failure, at a known cost, and
iv
we compare different swapping scenarios. The effect of components swapping on
preventive replacement actions is also considered.
In addition, we extend the approach of component swapping and the cost effec-
tiveness analysis of component swapping to phased mission system. We consider
two scenarios of swapping possibilities, namely, assuming that the possibilities of
component swapping can occur at any time during the mission or only at transition
of phases.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
With the need for highly reliable systems, there are many possibilities to make a
basic system more reliable or more resilient to possible faults. It may be possible
to add component redundancy or make individual components more reliable. In
addition, one may be able to repair failed components or replace them with new
ones. In this thesis, we consider a quite straightforward way in which some systems
may become more reliable and resilient to component failure, namely, the possibility
to replace a failed component by another component in the system that has not yet
failed, in effect swapping components. This is logically restricted to components
which are of the same type, hence it is likely that only some swapping opportunities
exist in a system. It seems that the increase in system reliability through such
component swapping has not received much attention in the literature, yet in some
scenarios it can be an attractive opportunity to prevent a system from failing. In
practice, this could enable preparation of substantial repair activities, or it may be
deemed to leave the system reliable enough to complete its mission.
Scenarios where swapping of components may be an option can include the fol-
lowing examples. Aerospace systems with multiple computers on board, where some
computers tasked with minor functions can be prepared to take over crucial functions
in case another computer fails. Lighting systems, where multiple locations must be
provided with light under contract but where partial lighting at any location may
be sufficient to meet the contractual requirements. Transport systems, where parts
of one mode of transport can be used to keep another one running. Organizations,
2
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where employees can be trained to take over some functioning of others in case of
unexpected absence.
It should be emphasized that swapping a component, upon failure, with another
component from the system, differs from the well-studied scenarios of using cold or
warm standby components or adding components in parallel to achieve increased
reliability [25, 33, 61, 71]. When we replace a failed component with a functioning
component that was already in the system, the subsystem, in which the later compo-
nent was originally placed, becomes less reliable. One can also compare the kind of
component swapping studied in this thesis to a minimal repair [60], in that the fail-
ure time distribution of the component does not change, but this is combined with
a change in the overall structure of the system due to the functioning component
being removed elsewhere.
In this thesis we consider the effect of defined component swap possibilities on the
total system reliability. We also consider the importance of individual components,
which can be strongly affected by opportunities to swap them and the joint reliability
importance (JRI) of two components. The survival signature concept is used to
derive the corresponding system reliability [18].
A system is usually designed and installed for completing a specific function. If
a system fails, it can cause losses such as loss of lives, damage to health, release
of hazardous materials, or economic losses including repair or replacement of any
damaged structures. These losses incur costs. It would be attractive if the cost that
is associated with system failure could be reduced by increasing system reliability
through component swapping. The operation of swapping components is likely to
incur some costs, for example for the actual swap or to prepare components to be
able to take over functionality of another component. This thesis also consider the
cost effectiveness of component swapping to increase system reliability. The cost
aspects is studied under the assumption that a system would need to function for a
given period of time, where failure to achieve this incurs a penalty cost. We compare
different swap scenarios with the option not to enable swaps, focusing on minimum
expected costs over the given period. We also consider the cost effectiveness of
component swapping from the perspective of renewal theory, so effectively over an
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unlimited time horizon. We assume that the system is entirely renewed upon fail-
ure, at a known cost, and we compare different swapping scenarios. The effect of
components swapping on preventive replacement actions is also considered [64].
A phased mission system (PMS) is one that performs several different tasks or
functions in sequence. In order to accomplish the mission successfully, the system in
every phase has to be completed without failure. Therefore, it is often difficult for a
PMS to work with high reliability. Generally, there are mainly two approaches that
can be used to improve the reliability of the PMS. The first way is increasing the
component reliability (reliability allocation), and the other way is using redundant
components in parallel (redundancy allocation) e.g. [3,23,43,50]. As an alternative
to these approaches, in this thesis we introduce the approach of component swapping
to enhance the reliability of phased mission system and to make it more resilient to
component failure. This approach is attractive since the reliability and the number of
the components do not need to be increased to improve the system reliability as the
other approaches. We consider two strategies of components swapping to improve
the reliability of PMS, namely, swapping components upon failure and swapping
components according to structure importance. The effect of both strategies on the
reliability of the PMS is studied under two scenarios of swapping possibilities. First,
it is assumed that the swap between components can be done at any time during
the mission. Second, it is assumed that the swap between components can be done
only at transition of phases. In this thesis we also study the effectiveness of the cost
of component swapping in reducing the expected costs of the failure of the PMS.
The expected costs when the two different scenarios of swapping possibilities are
applicable are compared with the option not to enable swaps, focusing on minimum
expected costs over the given period.
This introductory chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.1 introduces the
concept of resilience. Section 1.2 briefly reviews the concepts related to system reli-
ability and its measurement. Section 1.3 provides a brief introduction to reliability
importance. Section 1.4 introduces the concept of survival signature. Section 1.5
illustrates the aim and objectives of this research. A detailed outline of this thesis
is given in Section 1.6, with details of related publications.
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1.1 Resilience
The concept of resilience originated in the field of ecology. It is defined in this
field as the speed with which an ecosystem returns to the equilibrium state after a
perturbation [24]. After it emerged in the field of ecology, this concept is gradually
developed into different research fields. Despite an increase in the usage of the term
resilience, there is no universal agreement on its definition. It is defined variously
in different research fields such as social [1], organizational [30] and economical [56]
fields. In each research field the term has taken more specific meaning depending on
the field that it is introduced in. Although the concept of resilience has been around
for a long time, this concept is relatively new in the field of systems engineering [39].
Various definitions of the term resilience in the field of systems engineering have
been reviewed by [36]. In this thesis, resilience is defined to be the ability of systems
to recover quickly from failures.
In engineering systems redundancy is embedded in system design in order to
make the system resilient to possible faults. This strategy causes increase in the cost
of the system and does not always yield competitive results [69]. As an alternative
to this strategy, component swapping that is introduced in this thesis could be
embedded in system design, precisely, systems could be designed to be resilient
through allowing its components to be swapped. This would ensure that the system
returns to function quickly. In a more resilient system, the design of the system
would allow for component swaps to be beneficial in practice.
1.2 System reliability
In this thesis we assume that the term system is used to describe the collection of
components when connected to each other in some way to create the whole system.
We might consider any electronic devices as an example of a system. In this section
we briefly introduce the notation and concepts related to system reliability and its
measurement. In Section 1.2.1, we present the theory of structure function and we
briefly discuss related concepts. In Section 1.2.2, we discuss reliability measurement
based on the structure function.
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1.2.1 Structure function
The main characteristic of any systems in this thesis is that the functioning state
of the whole system is dependent on the functioning states of its components. To
quantify if the system is functioning or failed, it is assumed that the system and each
component are binary, which means that they are only in one of two possible states:
functioning or failed. We use the indicator 1 to denote the system or component
functions, and 0 to denote that the system or component fails.
Definition 1.2.1 For a system with m components, the state vector is a vector
x = (x1, x2, ..., xm) ∈ {0, 1}m, where xi is a binary variable indicating the functioning
state of the component i, for each i, so xi = 1 if the i
th component functions and
xi = 0 if the i
th component fails [42]. The labelling of the components is arbitrary
but must be fixed to define x.
It is assumed that the state of the system is completely determined by the states
of its components. A mapping called the structure function determines whether or
not the system is functioning when its components are in specific states.
Definition 1.2.2 Consider the space {0, 1}m of all possible state vectors for an
m-component system [42]. The structure function φ : {0, 1}m −→ {0, 1} is a
mapping that associates those state vectors x for which the system functions with
the value 1 and those state vectors x for which the system does not function with
the value 0.
The quantification of the structure function φ is dependent on the structure of a
system. The structure of a system shows how its components are connected to
each other. The connection between components represents how functioning of the
components influences the functioning of the system. A system is called coherent, if
its structural function is non-decreasing and each its component is relevant [42]. In
this thesis we consider only coherent systems. The following examples demonstrate
the structure of some simple systems and their structure functions φ.
1.2. System reliability 7
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Figure 1.1: A series system with three components
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Figure 1.2: A parallel system with three components
Example 1.2.1 (Series systems)
In a series system the components are connected to each other in series [2]. All
the components in a series system must function for the system to function. Figure
1.1 shows an example of a series system consisting of 3 components. The structure
function of a series system consisting of m components is
φ(x) =
m∏
i=1
xi (1.2.1)
Example 1.2.2 (Parallel systems) In a parallel system, the components are con-
nected to each other in parallel [2]. A parallel system functions, if at least one of its
components functions. For the system to be failed, all of its components must be
failed. Figure 1.2 shows an example of a parallel system consisting of 3 components.
The structure function of a parallel system consisting of m components is
φ(x) = 1−
m∏
i=1
(1− xi) (1.2.2)
Example 1.2.3 (Series-parallel and parallel-series systems) Series-parallel and parallel-
series systems consist of only combinations of subsystems in series or parallel con-
figuration [2]. A series-parallel system consists of parallel subsystems which are
connected to each other in series. A parallel-series systems consists of series subsys-
tems which are connected to each other in parallel. The structure functions of these
1.2. System reliability 8
B
C
A
Figure 1.3: A series-parallel system with three components
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Figure 1.4: A parallel-series system with three components
types of systems can be calculated using a combination of Formula (1.2.1) for series
systems and (1.2.2) for parallel systems. Figure 1.3 shows a series-parallel system
consisting of 3 components. The structure function φ for this system is given by
φ(x) = x1(1− (1− x2)(1− x3)) (1.2.3)
Figure 1.4 shows a parallel-series system consisting of 3 components. The first
series subsystems consists of the components A and B, and the second one consists
of the component C. The structure function φ for the overall system is
φ(x) = 1− (1− x1x2)(1− x3) (1.2.4)
Example 1.2.4 (k-out-of-m systems) A system with m components which func-
tions if and only if at least k of the m components function, for 1 ≤ k ≤ m, is called
a k-out-of-m:G system [72]. The structure function for a k-out-of-m:G system is
φ(x) =
1 if
∑m
i=1 xi > k
0 if
∑m
i=1 xi < k
(1.2.5)
A system with m components that fails if and only if at least k of the m com-
ponents fail, for 1 ≤ k ≤ m, is called a k-out-of-m:F system [72]. Based on the
definitions of a k-out-of-m:G system and a k-out-of-m:F system, a k-out-of-m:G
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system is equivalent to an (m − k + 1)-out-of-m:F system. The structure function
of a k-out-of-m:F system is
φ(x) =
1 if
∑m
i=1 xi > m− k + 1
0 if
∑m
i=1 xi < m− k + 1
(1.2.6)
The term k-out-of-m system is often used to refer to either a G system or a
F system or both. Series systems and parallel systems are special cases of k-out-
of-m systems. A series system is equivalent to an m-out-of-m:G system, and to a
1-out-of-m:F system. A parallel system is equivalent to a 1-out-of-m:G and to an
m-out-of-m:F system.
1.2.2 Reliability measurement
The reliability of a system is defined as the probability that the system functions
properly at a time t, and is denoted by R. To calculate the system reliability at a
fixed time t, we consider a system with m components. Let Xi be a random variable,
and
Xi =
1 if component i functions0 if component i fails (1.2.7)
Let pi = P (Xi = 1) be the probability that component i functions. Assuming
that Xi, i = 1, 2, ...,m are mutually statistically independent, and introducing no-
tation X = (X1, X2, ..., Xm) and p = (p1, p2, ..., pm), the reliability of a system is a
function of the reliability of its components and can be computed from the structure
function of the system [42],
R = P (φ(X) = 1) = R(p) (1.2.8)
The following example demonstrates reliability of some simple systems based on
their structure functions [42].
Example 1.2.5 The reliability of a series system consisting of m components, so
with structure function φ(x) =
∏m
i=1 xi, is given by
R(p) =
m∏
i=1
pi (1.2.9)
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The reliability of a parallel system consisting of m components, with structure
function φ(x) = 1−∏mi=1(1− xi), is given by
R(p) = 1−
m∏
i=1
(1− pi) (1.2.10)
If we assume that the random quantities Xi which represent the function of
the system components, are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.), so if
p1 = p2 = ... = pm = p, then the reliability of a k-out-of-m:G systems with structure
function φ(x) = 1 if
∑m
i=1 xi > k, is given by
R(p) =
m∑
i=k
(
m
i
)
pi(1− p)m−i (1.2.11)
In the i.i.d. case, the reliability of m-component series and parallel systems are
given by R(p) = pm and R(p) = 1− (1− p)m, respectively.
The reliability measure defined above deals with time as implicit and fixed be-
cause of this the time t doesn’t appear in the previous reliability equations. For
example, in the case of a 3-component series system, the system reliability is given
by R(p) = p1p2p3. The values of p1, p2 and p3 are given for a common time and
the reliability of the system is calculated for that time. However, in many real life
applications no specific time is specified in advance. In this situation, the time could
be considered as a variable in the reliability measure [42]. Let
Xi(t) =
1 if component i functions at time t0 if component i fails at time t (1.2.12)
Let random variable Ti ≥ 0 be the failure time of component i, i = 1, 2, ...,m.
The component failure characteristics can be described by probability distributions.
Assuming that component i has an absolutely continuous failure time distribution
with cumulative distribution function(CDF) Fi(t) and with probability density func-
tion (pdf)fi(t), then Fi(t) represents the probability that component i fails before
or at time t,
Fi(t) = P (Ti ≤ t) (1.2.13)
The reliability function of component i at time t is the probability that a com-
ponent i still functions at time t, R(t) = P (Ti > t). Since a component i either fails
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by time t, or survives at time t, we have
1− Fi(t) = P (Ti > t) = P (Xi(t) = 1) (1.2.14)
If we consider the 3-components series system in Figure 1.2.1, the reliability of the
system can be rewritten as P (TS > t) = [1−F1(t)][1−F2(t)][1−F3(t)]. In the case
that if the system components are i.i.d., Fi(t) = F (t) for i = 1, 2, 3, the reliability
of the system is be given by P (TS > t) = [1− F (t)]3. What is important and needs
to be emphasized is that, in this thesis, both the system and its components are
assumed to be non-repairable, so if a component is failed, it cannot work again, so
there are no repair activities.
1.3 Reliability importance
One of the important purposes of a reliability and risk analysis is to study the
component importance. Component importance measures are frequently used as
tools to evaluate and rank the impact of components on the system reliability [52].
The most important (critical) component for the system reliability should be given
priority with respect to improvements or maintenance. There are many applications
of importance measures in probabilistic risk analysis [12,29,34].
The first importance measure concept is introduced by Birnbaum in 1969 [11].
Birnbaum categorises the importance measures into three categories based on the
knowledge needed for determining them, namely, structure importance measures,
reliability importance measures and lifetime importance measures [11]. Structure
importance measures assume that the system structure is known and it measures
the relative importance of various components with respect to their positions in
a system. It is relevant to system design when several components with different
reliabilities can be arbitrarily assigned to several locations in the system. One would
like to assign more relible components to positions with higher structure importance.
Reliability importance measures depend on both the structure of the system and
reliability of components. It measures the change in the system reliability with
respect to the change in reliability of a specific component. The lifetime importance
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measures, depends on both the structure of the system and component lifetime
distribution [4].
Birnbaum reliability importance measure is defind as the rate at which the system
reliability changes with respect to changes in the reliability of a given component. It
is also defined as marginal reliability importance [32,38]. It is obtained for a binary
coherent system, by partial differentiation of the system reliability with respect to
the given component reliability. The reliability importance of component i when
the mission time of a system is implicit and fixed is given by
RIi =
∂R(p)
∂pi
(1.3.15)
where pi is the reliability of the i
th component, p = (p1, p2, ..., pm) is the vector
of components reliability and R is the reliability of the system. The Birnbaum
reliability importance of component i can be rewritten in the form
RIi = R(1i, p
i)−R(0i, pi) (1.3.16)
where pi represents the vector of components reliability with pi removed, (1i, p
i) and
(0i, p
i) represents the component reliability vector when component i is in state 1
and 0, respectively.
In the case that the mission time of a system is not fixed, the reliability impor-
tance of component i is defined as
RIi(t) = P (TS > t|Ti > t)− P (TS > t|Ti ≤ t) (1.3.17)
where TS is the random system failure time and Ti the random failure time of
component i, i = 1, 2, ...,m.
If it is assumed that all components are equally reliable and the reliability of each
component pj = 1/2, for all j 6= i, the Birnbaum reliability importance measure
reduces to Birnbaum structural importance measure, denoted by SIi,
SIi = SIi(i, 1/2, · · · , 1/2) = 1
2m−1
∑
xi
[
φ(1i, x
i)− φ(0i, xi)
]
(1.3.18)
where xi represents the component state vector with xi removed, (1i, x
i) and
(0i, x
i) represents the component vector when component i is in state 1 and 0,
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respectively, φ is the structure function of the system and 2m−1 represents the total
number of different state vectors with m− 1 in it [11].
Since Birnbaum reliability importance measure is introduced, there have been
quite many different importance measures introduced in the literature. Some of
them are based on the three categories defind by Birnbaum such as Fussell-Vesely
measure of importance [65] and the criticality importance measure [41], and there
are others which are apart from the three categories, such as the risk achievement
worth and the risk reduction worth [15, 16]. Feng et al [31] introduce component
importance measure based on survival signature to analyse systems with multiple
types of components.
The joint importance of two components for the system reliability has attracted
considerable attention in the reliability literature. Hong and Lie [35] defined the
the joint reliability importance (JRI) as a measure of how two components in a
system interact in contributing to system reliability. For a system with statistically
independent component reliabilities, the JRI of component i and j is defined as
JRIi,j =
∂2R(p)
∂pi∂pj
(1.3.19)
This can be simplified as [8],
JRIi,j = R(1i, 1j, p
i,j)−R(1i, 0j, pi,j)−R(0i, 1j, pi,j) +R(0i, 0j, pi,j) (1.3.20)
where pi,j represents the vector of components reliability with pi and pj removed,
1i and 0i represents the state when component i functions and doesn’t function,
respectively, and 1j and 0j represents the state when component j functions and
doesn’t function, respectively.
In the case that the mission time of a system is not fixed, the JRI of component
i and j is given by
JRIi,j(t) = P (TS > t|Ti > t, Tj > t)− P (TS > t|Ti > t, Tj ≤ t)
− P (TS > t|Ti ≤ t, Tj > t) + P (TS > t|Ti ≤ t, Tj ≤ t) (1.3.21)
where TS is the random system failure time, Ti the random failure time of com-
ponent i, Tj the random failure time of component j. This definition was extended
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in several ways. For example, Armstrong [8] presents a joint importance measure
for dealing with the statistical dependence between components and Wu [67] gen-
eralized JRI to multistate systems. Recently, Eryilmaz et al [27] have presented
general results on marginal and JRI for components with dependent failure time
distributions; they also used the concept of survival function.
The importance of a component and the joint importance of two components are
defined through their functions in a system, hence, we can expect that the ability to
swap components can have a strong effect on them. In Chapter 2 we examine the
effect of swapping components on the importance of individual components and on
the joint reliability importance (JRI) of two components.
In this thesis we introduce the strategy of swapping components according to
the structural importance. In this strategy the structural importance is used to
measure the importance level of the components of the same type in contributing to
system reliability. After the components are prioritized by structural importance,
the swapping rules are defined upon this prioritization. This is explained in more
detail in Chapter 4.
1.4 The survival signature
Quantification of system reliability has traditionally been based on the structure
function [5, 72]. Samaniego [57] introduced the system signature as a tool for relia-
bility assessment for systems consisting of components of a single type, which means
that their failure time distributions are exchangeable [44,48]. Samaniego’s signature
can be regarded as a summary of the structure function that is sufficient to derive
the system reliability function if the failure times of all the system’s components are
exchangeable, so in the case that all the system’s components are of one type.
Consider a coherent system of m components with independent identically dis-
tributed failure times. Let TS be the random failure time for the system, and Ti
be the random failure time of component i, i = 1, 2, ...,m. Tj:m is the j
th order
statistic of the m random component failure times giving the jth smallest compo-
nent lifetime, which is the time of the jth component failure, for j = 1, 2, ...,m. The
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system’s signature is defined to be the m-dimensional probability vector s, where
its jth element sj is the probability that the j
th component failure causes system
failure [58],
sj = P (TS = Tj:m) (1.4.22)
The value of an element sj of the system signature for j = 1, 2, ...,m can be
computed by implementing combinatorics and order statistic. The signature s is a
probability vector, so,
∑m
j=1 sj = 1 and sj ≥ 1 for all j. The reliability of the system
R(t) = P (TS > t) is
R(t) =
m∑
j=1
sjP (Tj:m > t) (1.4.23)
If the failure time distribution for the components is known and has cumulative
distribution function (CDF) F (t), then
R(t) =
m∑
j=1
sj
j−1∑
i=0
(
m
i
)
[F (t)]i[1− F (t)]m−i (1.4.24)
In the previous equation the reliability of the system is expressed as a function
of s and F (t) alone. It is clear that the main attraction of this signature is that
it enables separation of aspects of the system structure and the components failure
times distribution, which simplifies a range of reliability related problems such as
stochastic comparison of different system structures and inference on the system
reliability from component failure data.
The major drawback of Samaniego’s signature is that it can only be applied to
systems with single type of components, which is quite rare for real-world systems
and prevents the method to be used for analysis of networks [7]. To overcome this
limitation, Coolen and Coolen-Maturi [18] introduced the survival signature as an
alternative tool for system reliability quantification. This is also a summary of the
system structure function that is sufficient for a range of reliability computations
and inferences, including derivation of the system reliability function, and crucially,
it can be used for systems with multiple types of components. The only requirement
is that failure times of components of the same type are exchangeable. Components
of different types can be dependent. Of course, any such dependence must be mod-
eled, for example, through the use of copulas [47] or the use of multivariate failure
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time models including dependence [27, 28]. In this thesis, to present the swapping
opportunities without further complications, we throughout assume that the ran-
dom failure time of components of different types have independent failure times,
and in addition, we assume that the random failure times of components of the same
type are conditionally independent and identically distributed. These assumptions
can be relaxed without difficulty, such relaxation can of course alter the effect of
enabled swaps on the overall system reliability.
For a coherent system consisting of m components that are all of the same
type, the survival signature, denoted by Φ (l), for l = 1, ...,m, is defined as
the probability that the system functions, given that precisely l of its components
function [18]. Since in this thesis we considered only a coherent system Φ(l) is an
increasing function of l, with Φ(0) = 0 and Φ(m) = 1. If exactly l of the components
function, this means that there are
(
m
l
)
state vectors x with precisely l components
xi = 1, so with
∑m
i=1 xi = l, and all remaining xi = 0. Let Sl denote the set of
these state vectors, so |Sl| =
(
m
l
)
. Since we assume that all of the components are of
the same type, which means that they have exchangeable failure times, these state
vectors are equally likely to occur, hence
Φ(l) =
(
m
l
)−1∑
x∈Sl
φ (x) (1.4.25)
Let Ct ∈ {0, 1, ...,m} denote the number of components in the system that
function at time t > 0. Let the probability distribution of the component failure time
to have CDF F (t). F (t) gives the probability that a component is not functioning
at time t. If we assume that there are exactly l components functioning, then the
remaining m− l components must not function. Thus, for l ∈ {0, 1, ...,m}
P (C(t) = l) =
(
m
l
)
[F (t)]m−l[1− F (t)]l (1.4.26)
By using the partition theorem, the probability that the system functions at time
t can be derived easily by
P (TS > t) =
m∑
l=0
Φ(l)P (C(t) = l) (1.4.27)
It is clear from Equation (1.4.27) that the system structure is taken into account
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through the survival signature Φ(l), while the term P (C(t) = l) takes the random
failure times of the components into account.
Generalization of the signature to multiple types of components is quite compli-
cated [18]. However, the survival signature can be easily generalized for systems with
multiple types of components. Consider a system that consists of m components of
K ≥ 2 types, with mk components of type k ∈ {1, 2, ..., K} and
∑K
k=1mk = m [18].
Assume that the random failure times of components of the same type are exchange-
able, while full independence is assumed for the random failure times of components
of different types. Let the state vector xk =
(
xk1, x
k
2, ..., x
k
mk
) ∈ {0, 1}mk be the state
vector representing the state of the system components of type k, with xki = 1 if the
ith component of type k functions and xki = 0 if not. The labeling of the components
is arbitrary but must be fixed to define xk. Let x =
(
x1, x2, ..., xK
) ∈ {0, 1}m be the
state vector for the overall system. The structure function φ : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}, de-
fined for all possible x, takes the value 1 for a particular state vector x if the system
functions and 0 if the system does not function for the state vector x. The survival
signature is denoted by Φ (l1, l2, ...lK) and represents the probability that the system
functions, given that exactly lk of type k components function, for lk = 0, 1, ...,mk,
for each k = 1, 2, ..., K.
There are
(
mk
lk
)
state vectors xk with exactly lk of its mk components x
k
i = 1,
so with
∑mk
i=1 x
k
i = lk. We denote the set of these state vectors for components of
type k by Skl . Let Sl1,...,lK denote the set of all state vectors for the whole system for
which
∑mk
i=1 x
k
i = lk, for k = 1, 2, ..., K. Because of the assumption that the failure
times of mk components of type k are exchangeable, all the state vectors x
k ∈ Skl
are equally likely to occur, Thus, Φ (l1, l2, ...lK) can be calculated by
Φ (l1, l2, ...lK) =
(
K∏
k=1
(
mk
lk
)−1)
×
∑
x∈Sl1,...,lK
φ (x) (1.4.28)
Let Ckt ∈ {0, 1, ...,mk} denote the number of type k components in the system
that function at time t > 0. Using the assumed independence of failure times of
components of different types, the reliability of the system R(t) = P (TS > t) is
R(t) =
m1∑
l1=0
...
mK∑
lK=0
[
Φ(l1, ...lK)
K∏
k=1
P (Ckt = lk)
]
(1.4.29)
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Note that if one would not assume independence of the failure times of compo-
nents of different types, then the product of the marginal probabilities for individual
events Ckt = lk in this formula would be replaced by the joint probability of these
events, from which point a model must be assumed for this joint probability. Hence-
forth we assume, in addition to exchangeability of failure times of components of
the same type, that these failure times are conditionally independent and identically
distributed, with the probability distribution for the failure time of components of
type k specified by the cumulative distribution function (CDF) Fk(t). This leads to
R(t) =
m1∑
l1=0
...
mK∑
lK=0
[
Φ(l1, ...lK)
K∏
k=1
((
mk
lk
)
[Fk(t)]
mk−lk [1− Fk(t)]lk
)]
(1.4.30)
The survival signature is closely linked to Samaniego’s system signature for sys-
tems with a single type of components, and it is particularly useful for larger systems
with only a few different types of components. Recently, the survival signature has
attracted considerable interest from researchers in reliability, who have considered
both mathematical properties and aspects of application, including statistical infer-
ence [7, 19], comparison of different systems [59], and fast simulation methods [49].
Feng et al. [31] demonstrates a methodology to include explicitly the imprecision,
which leads to upper and lower bounds of the survival function of the system. An
efficient algorithm for computing exact system and survival signatures has been in-
troduced by [54, 55]. Aslett [6] has created a function in the statistical software
R to compute the survival signature, given a graphical presentation of the system
structure.
1.5 Research aim and objectives
The possibility to replace a failed component by another component in the system
that has not yet failed, swapping components, could be considered as a new approach
to enhance reliability and resilience of a system. In this thesis we aim to introduce
and study this approach.
The research objectives are:
1. Quantifying the reliability of a system if its components can be swapped.
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2. Examining the effect of swapping components on the total system reliability
and reliability importance.
3. Analysing the cost effectiveness of component swapping.
4. Extending the approach of component swapping and the cost effectiveness
analysis of component swapping to phased mission systems.
1.6 Outline of the thesis
This thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, the survival signature concept
is implemented to study the effect of component swapping on the total system
reliability. We also consider the effect of component swapping on the importance
of individual components and the joint reliability importance of two components.
A paper presenting the results of Chapter 2 has already been published in Applied
Stochastic Models in Business and Industry [46]. Some results in this chapter have
been presented at Research Students Conference in Probability and Statistics in
Durham in April 2017 and at the training school for Uncertainty Treatment and
Optimisation in Aerospace Engineering in 2018 at Durham University. It also been
presented at several seminars.
In Chapter 3, we study the cost effectiveness of component swapping to increase
system reliability over a fixed period of time. We also study the cost effectiveness of
component swapping over an unlimited time horizon from the perspective of renewal
theory. The effect of components swapping on preventive replacement actions is also
studied in this chapter. Some results in this chapter have been presented at 10th
IMA International Conference on Modelling in Industrial Maintenance and Relia-
bility in Manchester in June 2018 and a short paper has appeared in the conference
proceeding [45]. A paper based on this chapter has been submitted to the 29th edi-
tion European Safety and Reliability Conference (ESREL 2019) in Hannover that
will be held in September 2019. This chapter has also been presented at several
seminars.
In Chapter 4, we extend the strategy of swapping components upon failure that is
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introduced in Chapter 2, to improve the reliability of phased mission system (PMS)
and to make it more resilient to component failure. We also in this chapter intro-
duce another strategy that could be used to improve the reliability of PMS which
is swapping components according to the structural importance. In this chapter we
also extend the cost effectiveness analysis of component swapping that is introduced
in Chapter 3 to PMS. The strategy of swapping components according to the struc-
tural importance and the analysis related to it has been done in the collaboration
with Professor Xianzhen Huang (School of Mechanical Engineering and Automation,
Northeastern University, China) during his research visit to Durham University. A
paper based on this chapter is being prepared for submission to an international
peer-reviewed journal. We summarize our results with some concluding remarks in
Chapter 5. Part of this thesis will also be presented at 1st UK Reliability Meeting
in Durham in April 2019. All figures in this thesis were obtained using R. The R
codes are available from the author upon request.
Chapter 2
System reliability and component
importance when components can
be swapped upon failure
2.1 Introduction
In Chapter 1, we introduced an attractive strategy in which some systems may
become more reliable and resilient to component failure, namely, swapping com-
ponents. In this chapter we aim to use the survival signature concept that was
introduced in Section 1.4 to examine the effect of resilience through components
swapping on the reliability of systems with multiple types of components. Actually,
throughout this thesis we assume that there are fixed swapping rules, which pre-
scribe upon failure of a component precisely which other component takes over its
role in the system, if possible and if the other component is still functioning. The
objective of component swapping in this chapter is to increase the system reliability
by making the system more resilient to possible fault, so we further assume here
that such a swap of components can be done only when the system cannot function
with the existing components in place. Also, we assume that such a swap of compo-
nents takes neglectable time and does not affect the functioning of the component
that changes its role in the system nor its remaining time until failure. Under these
assumptions, in this chapter we analyse the effect of swapping components upon fail-
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ure on the total system reliability and reliability importance. Section 2.2, considers
the effect of swapping components on the total system reliability. We consider the
impact of possible component swapping on a reliability importance measure for an
individual component in Section 2.3, followed in Section 2.4 by attention to joint re-
liability importance of two components. In each section, we illustrate our approach
via examples. We end the chapter with some concluding remarks.
2.2 Swapping components
As we introduced in Section 1.4, the reliability of a system with m components of
K different types can be obtained by the use of the partition theorem involving
the survival signature of the system Φ (l1, l2, ...lK) and the probabilities that given
the numbers of components of each type will be functioning as given in Equation
(1.4.29). The survival signature takes into account the structure of the system,
and this information is separated from the failure time distributions of the system
components. We are able to quantify the reliability of the system if some components
can be swapped by two approaches. The effect of a regime of specified swaps can
be reflected through the system structure function, and hence, it can be taken into
account for computation of the system reliability through the survival signature.
Alternatively, the component can be defined based on its location, then, the effect
of the regime of specified swaps can be taken into account for computation of the
system reliability through the failure times of specific locations. The time at which
a specific location in the system will contain a failed component, might depend
on whether other specific locations contain a failed or functioning component. We
explain this approach in more detail later in Section 2.2.1, after we introduce the
first approach.
For a regime of specified swaps that will occur if specific components fail, let
φw (x) denote the system structure function given the defined swap in place. Com-
pared to the system’s structure function without swapping opportunities, φ (x), φw
will typically be equal to 1 for some x for which φ was equal to 0, reflecting the ben-
efit from swapping components upon failure, so φw (x) ≥ φ (x). Let Φw (l1, l2, ...lK)
2.2. Swapping components 23
denote the survival signature given the defined swapping regime is in place, so
Φw (l1, l2, ...lK) =
(
K∏
k=1
(
mk
lk
)−1)
×
∑
x∈Sl1,...,lK
φw (x) . (2.2.1)
Let Tw denote the random system failure time with the specified swapping regime
in place. Therefore, the reliability of the system with the specified swapping regime
in place Rw(t) = P (Tw > t) is
Rw(t) =
m1∑
l1=0
...
mK∑
lK=0
[
Φw(l1, ...lK)
K∏
k=1
((
mk
lk
)
[Fk(t)]
mk−lk [1− Fk(t)]lk
)]
(2.2.2)
It is important to notice here that the swapping regime is entirely reflected in the
system survival signature. Crucially, the components have kept the same failure time
distributions and the same assumptions apply, that is failure times of components of
the same type remain independent and identically distributed, and failure times of
components of different types remain independent. The increase in reliability caused
by the swapping regime, when compared to the system without possible swapping,
is given by
Rw(t)−R(t) =
m1∑
l1=0
...
mK∑
lK=0
[
{Φw(l1, ...lK)− Φ(l1, ...lK)}
K∏
k=1
((
mk
lk
)
[Fk(t)]
mk−lk [1− Fk(t)]lk
)]
(2.2.3)
Hence, as long as a swapping regime leads to an increase of the survival signature,
for at least one of its values, it will be of benefit for the overall system reliability.
It is also obvious that a series system can never benefit from such swapping, simply
because it only functions if all of its components function. This is reflected by
the fact that for a series system, the two survival signatures considered here are
always equal. The above result for the difference of the reliability of the system
with and without possible swapping, ensures that some relevant computations, for
example, for importance measures as presented in Sections 2.3 and 2.4, are quite
straightforward. To illustrate the above way to reflect the effect of a component
swapping regime, we present the following two examples.
Example 2.2.1 Consider the system in Figure 2.1, which consists of four compo-
nents of two types, so m1 = m2 = 2. We want to examine the reliability of this
system in the case that components A and B can be swapped. Of course, this
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A 
D
C
B
1
1
2
2
Figure 2.1: System with four components of two types
l1 l2 Φ Φ
w
0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 2 0 0
1 0 0 0
1 1 1/2 1
1 2 1/2 1
2 0 1 1
2 1 1 1
2 2 1 1
Table 2.1: Survival signatures for the system in Figure 2.1
swap only has a positive effect on the system reliability if component A fails while
component B still functions and at least one of components C or D also still func-
tions. So, the system’s structure function with this swap applied if needed, changes
from value 0 to 1 for three values of the state vector x (with entries alphabetically
ordered): (0, 1, 0, 1), (0, 1, 1, 0), (0, 1, 1, 1), as in these cases the failed component A
will be replaced by component B which is functioning, and indeed at least one more
component functions. The corresponding survival signatures, Φ (l1, l2) for the sys-
tem without the swap, and Φw (l1, l2) with this specific swap applied if needed, are
given in Table 2.2 for all l1, l2 ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
The reliability of the system without the swap being possible, and the reliability
of the system with the swap applied if needed, is obtained by multiplying Φ (l1, l2)
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Figure 2.2: Reliability of system in Figure 2.1
and Φw (l1, l2) by the probability that the number of components of each type will
be functioning, assuming independence of failure time of components of different
types. Let the CDFs of the failure times of the Type 1 and Type 2 components be
F1(t) and F2(t), respectively. Then the reliability R(t) of the system without the
swap being possible, and the reliability Rw(t) of the system with the swap applied
if needed are
R(t) = [F1(t)][1− F1(t)][1− [F2(t)]2] + [1− F1(t)]2
Rw(t) = 2[F1(t)][1− F1(t)][1− [F2(t)]2] + [1− F1(t)]2 (2.2.4)
Figure 2.2 presents R(t) and Rw(t) if the failure times of Type 1 components
have a Weibull distribution with shape parameter 2 and scale parameter 1, that
is with CDF F1(t) = 1 − e−t2 , and the failure times of Type 2 components have
an Exponential distribution with expected value 1, so with CDF F2(t) = 1 − e−t.
This figure clearly presents the gain in reliability of the system due to the possible
component swap.
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D
E
2 C
B1
A1
Figure 2.3: System with five components of two types
Example 2.2.2 Consider the system in Figure 2.3, which consists of five com-
ponents m = 5 with two types K = 2, so m1 = 2 and m2 = 3. We want to
examine the reliability of this system in the case that components A and B can
be swapped. The system can benefit from this swap if components A and C are
functioning while components B, D and E are failed and if components A and C
are failed while component B and at least one of components D and E are function-
ing. So, the system’s structure function with this swap applied, changes from value
0 to 1 for four values of the state vector x (with entries alphabetically ordered):
(1, 0, 1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0, 1, 0), (0, 1, 0, 0, 1), (0, 1, 0, 1, 1). The survival signature, Φ (l1, l2)
for the system without the swap, and Φw (l1, l2) with the swap applied, are given in
Table 2.2 for all l1 ∈ {0, 1, 2} and l2 ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}.
Let the probability distribution of the Type 1 components failure time have CDF
F1(t) and the probability distribution of the Type 2 components failure time have
CDF F2(t). Then the reliability of the system R(t) without the swap being possible,
and the reliability Rw(t) of the system with the swap applied if needed are
R(t) =[F1(t)]
2
[
2[F2(t)][1− F2(t)]2 + [1− F2(t)]3
]
+ [F1(t)][1− F1(t)][
3[F2(t)]
2[1− F2(t)] + 5[F2(t)][1− F2(t)]2 + 2[1− F2(t)]3
]
+ [1− F1(t)]2.
Rw(t) =[F1(t)]
2
[
2[F2(t)][1− F2(t)]2 + [1− F2(t)]3
]
+ 2[F1(t)][1− F1(t)][
1− [F2(t)]3
]
+ [1− F1(t)]2. (2.2.5)
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l1 l2 Φ Φ
w
0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 2 2/3 2/3
0 3 1 1
1 0 0 0
1 1 1/2 1
1 2 5/6 1
1 3 1 1
2 0 1 1
2 1 1 1
2 2 1 1
2 3 1 1
Table 2.2: Survival signatures for the system in Figure 2.3
If we keep the same scenario for the failure times of Type 1 and Type 2 com-
ponents as in Example 2.2.1, we can see in Figure 2.4 how the system’s reliability
change over time before and after the possible component swaps. It is clear that
there would be a good improvement in the system’s reliability if the system is de-
signed in the way that we could implement the defined swap.
It is clear from the previous example that the effect the swap between components
A and B is fully taken into account through the system structure function, and hence
the survival signature. This has the important advantage that each components
remains of the same type when compared to the system without swaps being possible.
This is not the case in the alternative approach as we will see.
2.2.1 Alternative approach
In this approach we consider the change that might happen in reliability of a system
if its components can be swapped upon failure in the failure times of the specific
locations that the system’s components fixed on. For example, for the system in
Figure 2.1, let us assume that LA, LB, LC and LD denote the locations in the
system that components A, B, C and D are fixed on, respectively. If a swap could
take place as considered in Example 2.2.1, then location LA would have as failure
2.2. Swapping components 28
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Time
R
el
ia
bi
lity
R
Rw
Figure 2.4: Reliability of the system in Figure 2.3
time the maximum of the failure times of components A and B, and location LB
would have as failure time the minimum of the failure times of components A and B.
Hence, LA and LB would not have exchangeable failure times anymore, and hence
they would not be of the same type, so the swap breaks down these locations into
two different types.
In order to consider the change that might happen in reliability in the failure
times of the specific locations, we define the survival signature according to the
specific locations. Consider a system with m components. Let L1, L2, · · · , Lm rep-
resent different locations in the system that the components might be fixed on. TLj
denote the failure time of location Lj, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,m} and it represents the time
at which this location will contain a failed component. The survival signature of
specific locations gives the probability that system functions if there is exactly Yb of
type b locations functioning. Assuming that the random failure times of locations of
the same type are exchangeable, while full independence is assumed for the random
failure times of locations of different types. If we have B ≥ 2 types of locations with
mb locations of type b ∈ {1, 2, · · · , B} and
∑B
b=1mb = m, a
b
j is used to donate the
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functioning states of the j location of type b. abj = 1 if j
th location of type b function
and abj = 0 if it fails. a
b =
(
ab1, a
b
2, · · · , abmb
)
is a state vector that represents the
state of type b locations and a =
(
a1, a2, · · · , aB) is the state vector for the overall
system. The structure function that gives the overall state of the system according
to the functioning status of specific locations is denoted by φL (a).
There are
(
mb
Yb
)
state vectors ab with exactly Yb of its mb locations a
b
j = 1, so
with
∑mb
j=1 a
b
j = Yb. We denote the set of these state vectors for locations of type
b by SbY . Let SY1,...,YB denote the set of all state vectors for the whole system for
which
∑mb
j=1 a
b
j = Yb, for b = 1, 2, ..., B. Because of the assumption that the failure
times of mb locations of type b are exchangeable, all the state vectors a
b ∈ SbY are
equally likely to occur. The survival signature of specific locations is denoted by
ΦL (Y1, Y2, · · · , YB), and is given as follows:
ΦL (Y1, Y2, · · · , YB) =
(
B∏
b=1
(
mb
Yb
)−1)
×
∑
a∈SY1,··· ,YB
φ (a) . (2.2.6)
To find the reliability of the system Rw(t) that considers a defined swap, we
find ΦL (Y1, Y2, · · · , YB) , then we multiply it by the probability that the number of
specific locations of each type will be functioning, taking into account the defined
swap in the failure time of specific locations. Let N bt ∈ {0, 1, ...,mb} denote the
number of type b locations in the system that function at time t > 0. To find
P (N1t = Y1, N
2
t = Y2, · · · , NBt = YB), we need to find the joint probability that
consider the dependency that occurred between specific locations as a result of the
defined swap.
Rw(t) =
m1∑
Y1=0
...
mB∑
YB=0
[
ΦL (Y1, Y2, · · · , YB)P (N1t = Y1, N2t = Y2, · · · , NBt = YB)
]
(2.2.7)
This approach is illustrated in more detail through the following two examples.
Example 2.2.3 Consider the same system in Figure 2.1 and the same swapping
possibility between components A and B as discussed in Example 2.2.1. The time
at which location LA fails, TLA , is dependent on the time at which location LB fails,
TLB . TLA = max(TA, TB) and TLB = min(TA, TB) where TA is the failure time of
component A with disregard to its location and TB is the failure time of component
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Y1 Y2 Y3 ΦL Y1 Y2 Y3 ΦL
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1
0 0 2 0 1 0 2 1
0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1
0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
0 1 2 0 1 1 2 1
Table 2.3: Survival signature ΦL of system in Figure 2.1
B with disregard to its location. It is clear that under the defined swap, LA and
LB represent two different types of locations. We have Y1 ∈ {0, 1} corresponding
to location LA and we have Y2 ∈ {0, 1} corresponding to location LB. The defined
swap does not change the locations of Type 2 components, so all of the locations of
Type 2 components still have the same type as its components we denote this Type
3 and we have Y3 ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
In order to find the reliability of the system, we calculate ΦL (Y1, Y2, Y3) with
disregard to the structure of components in the system. For example, in the situ-
ation that if location LA fails while locations LB, LC and LD are still functioning,
the structure function in this situation is φL (a
1
1 = 0, a
2
1 = 1, a
3
1 = 1, a
3
2 = 1) = 0,
comparing to the structure function φ(x11 = 0, x
1
2 = 1, x
2
1 = 1, x
2
2 = 1) = 0 for the
original system, φL breaks down the system locations to different types according to
the change that happens in their failure times as a result of the defined swap. Table
2.3 demonstrates ΦL for all Y1, Y2 ∈ {0, 1} and Y3 ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
To find P (N1t = Y1, N
2
t = Y2, N
3
t = Y3) for all Y1, Y2 ∈ {0, 1} and Y3 ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
We need to find the joint probability of P (N1t = Y1, N
2
t = Y2) for all Y1, Y2 ∈ {0, 1}
then multiply it by the probability that the number of locations of type 3 will be
functioning P (N3t = Y3) because under the defined swap, N
3
t is still independent of
N1t and N
2
t .
Components A and B are of the same type. So, TA and TB are identically
distributed TA, TB ∼ F1(t) where F1(t) is CDF of the failure time of Type 1 com-
ponent. Under the defined swap, the probability that the two locations LA and
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LB are functioning together at time t > 0 is P (N
1
t = 1, N
2
t = 1) = [1 − F1(t)]2
and the probability that these two locations are not functioning at time t > 0 is
P (N1t = 0, N
2
t = 0) = [F1(t)]
2. The event that location LA functions while location
LB is failed will occur when location LA contains functioning component A and
location LB contains a failed component B or when component A fails at location
LA and it was swapped with functioning component B. The probability of this event
is P (N1t = 1, N
2
t = 0) = 2[F1(t)][1 − F1(t)]. Also, it is impossible that location LB
functions while location LA fails. So, P (N
1
t = 0, N
2
t = 1) = 0. If we substitute the
values of ΦL and the joint probability in Equation (2.2.7), we can find that
Rw(t) = 2[F1(t)][1− F1(t)][1− [F2(t)]2] + [1− F1(t)]2 (2.2.8)
Comparing the results in Equations (2.2.4) and (2.2.8), we can clearly see that
we arrived at the same result by implementing the two different approaches.
Example 2.2.4 Consider again the system in Figure 2.3 and the same swapping
possibility between the components A and B as discussed in Example 2.2.5. The
defined swap will only change the failure time of locations LA and LB in the
situations when the location LC functions while the locations LD and LE fail,
TLA = min(TA, TB) and TLB = max(TA, TB), and in the situation that the location
LC fails while at least one of the locations LD and LE function, TLA = max(TA, TB)
and TLB = min(TA, TB). In the situation that the location LC , LD and LE are func-
tioning together or failed together, the swap will not influence the failure time of
locations LA and LB. Thus, they still have their original failure times in this situa-
tion, TLA = TA and TLB = TB. It clear that the failure time TLA is not exchangeable
with the failure time TLB . So, the locations LA and LB represent two different types
namely Type 1 and Type 2 locations and we have Y1 ∈ {0, 1} corresponding to the
number of Type 1 locations functioning and we have Y2 ∈ {0, 1} corresponding to
the number of Type 2 locations functioning. Since TLA and TLB dependent on TLC
and either one of TLD and TLE , we breakdown the location of Type 3 components
into two types, namely Type 3 location represents the location LC and Type 4 rep-
resents the location LD and LE. So, we have Y3 ∈ {0, 1} and Y4 ∈ {0, 1, 2}. Table
2.4 demonstrates ΦL (Y1, Y2, Y3, Y4) for all Y1, Y2, Y3 ∈ {0, 1} and Y4 ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
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Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 ΦL Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 ΦL
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 2 1
0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1
0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1
0 1 0 2 0 1 1 0 2 1
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
0 0 1 2 1 1 0 1 2 1
0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1
Table 2.4: Survival signature ΦL of system in Figure 2.3
Components A and B are of the same type. So, TA and TB are identically dis-
tributed TA, TB ∼ F1(t) where F1(t) is CDF of the failure time of Type 1 components.
Components C, D and E are of the same type. So, TC , TD and TE are identically dis-
tributed TC , TD, TE ∼ F2(t) where F2(t) is CDF of the failure time of Type 2 compo-
nents. It is clear that the joint probability P (N1t = Y1, N
2
t = Y2, N
3
t = Y3, N
4
t = Y4)
would be different than the joint probability for the original system only in the
situations when N1t = 1 and N
2
t = 0 or when N
1
t = 0 and N
2
t = 1. For example,
P (N1t = 1, N
2
t = 0, N
3
t = 0, N
4
t = 1) = 4[1 − F1(t)][F1(t)][1 − F2(t)][F2(t)]2 because
the event that LA and one of LD or LE function while LB and LC are failed will
occur in 4 situations namely, when LA contains functioning component A and LD
contains functioning component D and LB, LC and LE contain failed components,
or when LA contains functioning component A and LE contains functioning compo-
nent E and LB, LC and LD contain failed components, or when component A fails at
LA and it is swapped by the functioning component B and LD contains functioning
component D and LB, LC and LE contain failed components, or when component
A fails at location LA and it is swapped by the functioning component B and LE
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Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 P (N
1
t = Y1, N
2
t = Y2, N
3
t = Y3, N
4
t = Y4)
1 0 0 0 [1− F1(t)][F1(t)][F2(t)]3
1 0 0 1 4[1− F1(t)][F1(t)][1− F2(t)][F2(t)]2
1 0 0 2 2[1− F1(t)][F1(t)][1− F2(t)]2[F2(t)]
1 0 1 0 0
1 0 1 1 2[1− F1(t)][F1(t)][1− F2(t)]2[F2(t)]
1 0 1 2 [1− F1(t)][F1(t)][F2(t)]3
0 1 0 0 [1− F1(t)][F1(t)][F2(t)]3
0 1 0 1 0
0 1 0 2 0
0 1 1 0 2[1− F1(t)][F1(t)][1− F2(t)][F2(t)]2
0 1 1 1 2[1− F1(t)][F1(t)][1− F2(t)]2[F2(t)]
0 1 1 2 [1− F1(t)][F1(t)][F2(t)]3
Table 2.5: The probability in the cases when N1t = 1 and N
2
t = 0 and in the cases
when N1t = 0 and N
2
t = 1 in Example 2.2.4
contains functioning component C and LB, LC and LD contain failed component.
Table 2.5 shows P (N1t = Y1, N
2
t = Y2, N
3
t = Y3, N
4
t = Y4) in the cases when N
1
t = 1
and N2t = 0 and in the cases when N
1
t = 0 and N
2
t = 1 , for all Y3 ∈ {0, 1} and
Y4 ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
By substituting the values of ΦL (Y1, Y2, Y3, Y4) and P (N
1
t = Y1, N
2
t = Y2, N
3
t =
Y3, N
4
t = Y4) for all Y1, Y2, Y3 ∈ {0, 1} and Y4 ∈ {0, 1, 2} in Equation(2.2.7), we can
find that
Rw(t) =[F1(t)]
2
[
2[F2(t)][1− F2(t)]2 + [1− F2(t)]3
]
+ 2[F1(t)][1− F1(t)][
1− [F2(t)]3
]
+ [1− F1(t)]2. (2.2.9)
Therefore, we arrived at the same result as in Example 2.2.2. It clear from
the previous examples that while we arrived at the same result by implementing
the two different approaches. The first approach in which the effect of a defined
swapping regime is fully taken into account through the system structure function,
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Figure 2.5: System with 8 components of 3 types; C,F,H form a 2-out-of-3 subsystem
and hence the survival signature is more attractive than the second one, since it has
continued with the same advantage of survival signature by modeling the structure
of systems and separating it from the random failure time of components. However,
in the second approach in which the effect of such a component swap is taken into
account through the failure times of specific locations, the lifetime distributions
become extremely complex and may not be feasible if one has a variety of swapping
opportunities. This thesis considers only the first approach for reliability assessment
when system components can be swapped.
The following extensive example is comparing the change that might happen in
the reliability as a result of different swapping opportunities. We can see through
this example how the reliability of the system can be obtained easily by considering
the first approach, however it would be quite difficult to obtain it by the second
approach.
Example 2.2.5 The system in Figure 2.5 consists of 8 components of 3 types,
m = 8 and K = 3, m1 = 3, m2 = 3 and m3 = 2. The letters A to H represent
the specific components, the numbers 1 to 3 represent the component types. This
system consist of three subsystems in series configuration. The first subsystem is
a parallel system consisting of components A and D, the second subsystem is a
parallel system consisting of components B, E and G, and the third subsystem is a
2-out-of-3 system consisting of components C, F and H.
The reliability of this system might be enhanced by a variety of swapping op-
portunities, we compare 7 swapping cases. In Case 1, we assume that we are able
to swap only Type 1 components, in Case 2, we assume that we are able to swap
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only Type 2 components, in Case 3, we assume that we are able to swap only Type
3 components, in Case 4, we assume that we are able to swap both Type 1 and
Type 2 components, in Case 5, we assume that we are able to swap both Type 1
and Type 3 components, in Case 6, we assume that we are able to swap both Type
2 and Type 3 components, in Case 7, we assume that we are able to swap Type 1,
Type 2 and Type 3 components. In each case the swap can be done in any way
when needed to keep the system functioning.
The survival signatures are given in Table 2.6, where Φ is the survival signature
for the original system and Φw, w ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7} are the survival signatures in
Cases 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7. In this table we present only nonzero values. The zero
values represent the situations when the system has only 3 functioning components
or less, because the system needs at least 4 components to function. In Case 7, all
nonzero values are equal to 1, because in this case we can swap components of all
types, so the system just needs four functioning components of any type in order to
function.
In order to see the change to the system’s reliability as a result of each of swap-
ping case, we assume that the failure times of Type 1 components have a Weibull
distribution with shape parameter 2 and scale parameter 1, the failure times of
Type 2 components have an Exponential distribution with expected value 1 and the
failure times of Type 3 components have an Exponential distribution with expected
value 2, so F1(t) = 1 − e−t2 , F2(t) = 1 − e−t and F3(t) = 1 − e−t/2. The reliability
functions of the system in Cases 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 are given in Figure 2.6. Case
0 in this figure represents the reliability function for the original system. Clearly,
while all swap cases would enhance the system reliability, Cases 7 and 4 provide the
best improvement, which is mainly due to the fact that in Case 7 all the components
are involved in the swaps and in Case 4, six components are involved in the swaps,
including the two components in the first subsystem.
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l1 l2 l3 Φ Φ
1 Φ2 Φ3 Φ4 Φ5 Φ6 Φ7
0 2 2 1/3 1/3 1 1/3 1 1/3 1 1
0 3 1 1/2 1/2 1/2 1 1/2 1 1 1
0 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 2 2/9 2/3 2/3 2/9 1 2/3 2/3 1
1 2 1 2/9 2/3 2/3 4/9 1 1 1 1
1 2 2 5/9 1 1 5/9 1 1 1 1
1 3 0 1/3 1 1/3 1/3 1 1 1/3 1
1 3 1 2/3 1 2/3 1 1 1 1 1
1 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 0 2 1/3 1 1/3 1/3 1 1 1/3 1
2 1 1 2/9 2/3 2/3 4/9 1 1 1 1
2 1 2 5/9 1 1 5/9 1 1 1 1
2 2 0 1/3 2/3 2/3 1/3 1 2/3 2/3 1
2 2 1 1/2 5/6 5/6 7/9 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 7/9 1 1 7/9 1 1 1 1
2 3 0 2/3 1 2/3 2/3 1 1 2/3 1
2 3 1 5/6 1 5/6 1 1 1 1 1
2 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3 0 1 1/2 1/2 1/2 1 1/2 1 1 1
3 0 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3 1 0 1/3 1/3 1 1/3 1 1/3 1 1
3 1 1 2/3 2/3 1 1 1 1 1 1
3 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3 2 0 2/3 2/3 1 2/3 1 2/3 1 1
3 2 1 5/6 5/6 1 1 1 1 1 1
3 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3 3 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Table 2.6: The survival signatures of system in Figure 2.5
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Figure 2.6: Reliability of the system in Figure 2.5
2.3 Component reliability importance
We examine the reliability importance of a specific component if we assume that
some components in the system can be swapped. We consider the relative im-
portance index RIi(t) as introduced by [31], which is the difference between the
probability that the system functions at time t given that component i functions at
time t, and the probability that the system functions at time t given that component
i is not functioning at time t, so
RIi(t) = P (TS > t|Ti > t)− P (TS > t|Ti < t)
The conditional survival functions P (TS > t|Ti > t) and P (TS > t|Ti < t) can
be obtained quite easily by deriving the survival signatures corresponding to the
two possible states of component i. We can compute this for the system without
swapping being possible as well as for specific swapping regimes, and it is of interest
to consider the change in importance of specific components resulting from the
swapping possibilities. We illustrate this using the same systems and swapping
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A B C, D
l1 l2 Φ˜1 Φ˜0 Φ˜1 Φ˜0 l1 l2 Φ˜1 Φ˜0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 1/2 0
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1/2 1/2
1 1 1 0 1 1 2 0 1 1
1 2 1 0 1 1 2 1 1 1
Table 2.7: Φ˜1 and Φ˜0 for components A, B, C, D
regimes considered in Examples 2.2.1 and 2.2.5.
Example 2.3.1 Consider again the system in Figure 2.1 and the same swapping
possibility as discussed in Example 2.2.1. We refer to the original case of the system
when there is no swapping possible between components as Case 0. We refer to
the case when components A and B can be swapped as Case 1. To calculate the
relative importance indices in Case 0, we first calculate the survival signature of
the system conditional on the component of interest functioning, which we denote
by Φ˜1 (l1, l2), where it should be noted that either l1 or l2 (corresponding to the
type of the component of interest) now only takes values in {0, . . . ,mk − 1} for
k = 1 or k = 2, as it only reflects the number of the other components of the
same type that are functioning. Similarly, we calculate the survival signature of the
system conditional on the component of interest not functioning, which we denote
by Φ˜0 (l1, l2). The survival signatures Φ˜1 (l1, l2) and Φ˜0 (l1, l2) are given in Table 2.7
for all components, note of course that these are identical for components C and D.
The relative importance index for component A, RIA(t), is derived by
RIA(t) =
1∑
l1=0
2∑
l2=0
[
Φ˜1 (l1, l2)− Φ˜0 (l1, l2)
] 2∏
k=1
P (Ckt = lk)
leading to
RIA(t) = [F1(t)]
[
1− [F2(t)]2
]
+ [1− F1(t)]
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A B C, D
l1 l2 Φ˜
1
1 Φ˜
1
0 Φ˜
1
1 Φ˜
1
0 l1 l2 Φ˜
1
1 Φ˜
1
0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 2 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 2 0 1 1
1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1
Table 2.8: Φ˜11 and Φ˜
1
0 for components A, B, C, D
Similarly, we derive
RIB(t) = [1− F1(t)][F2(t)]2
RIC(t) = RID(t) = [F1(t)][1− F1(t)][F2(t)]
We aim to determine the differences that might occur in RIA(t), RIB(t), RIC(t)
and RID(t) in Case 1, in which we assume that components A and B can be swapped.
To calculate the relative importance indices in Case 1, Φ˜11 (l1, l2) represents the
survival signature with the swap enabled, if the component of interest functions, and
Φ˜10 (l1, l2) if the component does not function. We denote the relative importance
index of component i if the Case 1 swap is possible by RI1i (t). Table 2.8 presents
Φ˜11 and Φ˜
1
0 for all the components in Case 1.
The relative importance index for component A, RI1A(t), is derived by
RI1A(t) =
1∑
l1=0
2∑
l2=0
[
Φ˜11 (l1, l2)− Φ˜10 (l1, l2)
] 2∏
k=1
P (Ckt = lk)
leading to
RI1A(t) = [F1(t)]
[
1− [F2(t)]2
]
+ [1− F1(t)][F2(t)]2
Similarly we derive
RI1B(t) = [F1(t)]
[
1− [F2(t)]2
]
+ [1− F1(t)][F2(t)]2
RI1C(t) = RI
1
D(t) = 2[F1(t)][1− F1(t)][F2(t)]
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To compare the relative importance indices of the system’s components in Cases
0 and 1, we use the same failure time distributions for Type 1 and Type 2 components
as in Example 2.2.1. Figure 2.7 (a) and (b) show the relative importance indices of
the system’s components in Cases 0 and 1, respectively. These figures show that in
Case 0, component A is clearly the most important, yet with the swapping possible
between components A and B in Case 1 these two components become equally
important.
Example 2.3.2 We consider the component importance for the system in Figure
2.5, under the same swapping possibilities that we introduced in Example 2.2.5,
namely in Case 1, we assume that we are able to swap only Type 1 components, in
Case 2, we assume that we are able to swap only Type 2 components, in Case 3,
we assume that we are able to swap only Type 3 components, in Case 4, we assume
that we are able to swap both Type 1 and Type 2 components, in Case 5, we assume
that we are able to swap both Type 1 and Type 3 components, in Case 6, we assume
that we are able to swap both Type 2 and Type 3 components, in Case 7, we assume
that we are able to swap Type 1, Type 2 and Type 3 components. We refer to the
original Case, in which there is no swap option as Case 0. We also assume the same
component failure time distributions as in Example 2.2.5.
The survival signatures for all components of Type 1 are given in Table 2.9, the
survival signatures for all components of Type 2 are given in Table 2.10 and the
survival signatures for all components of Type 3 are given in Table 2.11. In these
tables Φ˜1 and Φ˜0 are the survival signatures for the components in Case 0 and Φ˜
w
1
and Φ˜w0 , w ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7} are the survival signatures for the components in
Cases 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7. In these tables we present only non zero values.
Figures 2.8(a)-(h) show the relative importance indices of the components in
these cases. These figures show that due to the ability of swapping between compo-
nents, in Case 1, the components of Type 1 become equally important and, in Case
2, the components of Type 2 become equally important and, in Case 3, the compo-
nents of Type 3 become equally important, in Case 4, the components of Type 1
become equally important and the components of Type 2 become equally important,
in Case 5, the components of Type 1 become equally important and the components
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Figure 2.7: The relative importance indices of components in Figure 2.1
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of Type 3 become equally important, in Case 6, the components of Type 2 become
equally important and the components of Type 3 become equally important and in
Case 7, the components of Type 1 become equally important, the components of
Type 2 become equally important and the components of Type 3 become equally
important for system reliability.
The importance of specific components dependents on the swapping cases that
would be allowed as well as the component failure time distributions. If we consider
only the period of time from t = 0 to t = 0.4, for example, then we can see that in
this period, in Cases 0, 1 and 4, component H is the most important component, in
Case 2 and 6, component C is the most important component, in Case 3, compo-
nent A is the most important component, in Case 5, components G and H are the
most important components, and in Case 7, components A, B and C are the most
important components for system reliability.
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A B C A, B, C A B C A
l1 l2 l3 Φ˜1 Φ˜0 Φ˜1 Φ˜0 Φ˜1 Φ˜0 Φ˜
1
1 Φ˜
1
0 Φ˜
1
1 Φ˜
1
0 Φ˜
1
1 Φ˜
1
0 Φ˜
2
1 Φ˜
2
0 Φ˜
3
1 Φ˜
3
0
0 1 2 1/3 0 0 0 1/3 0 2/3 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1/3 0
0 2 1 1/6 0 1/6 0 1/3 0 2/3 0 1/3 0 1/2 0 1 0 1/3 0
0 2 2 2/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 2/3 1/3 1 1/3 1 1 1 1 1 1 2/3 1/3
0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 3 1 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1 1/2 1 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1 1/2 1 1
0 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 2 1/2 0 1/2 0 1/2 0 1 0 1/2 0 1/2 0 1/2 0 1/2 0
1 1 1 1/6 0 1/6 0 1/3 0 2/3 0 3/4 0 1/2 0 3/4 0 1/2 0
1 1 2 2/3 1/6 1/3 1/3 2/3 1/3 1 2/3 1 1/2 1 1 1 1/2 2/3 1/6
1 2 0 1/6 0 1/6 0 1/6 0 2/3 0 1/2 0 1/2 0 1 0 1/6 0
1 2 1 1/2 1/4 5/12 1/3 7/12 1/6 5/6 2/3 3/4 3/4 3/4 3/4 1 1/2 5/6 1/2
1 2 2 5/6 1/2 2/3 2/3 5/6 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 5/6 1/2
1 3 0 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1 0 1 1 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1 0 1/2 1/2
1 3 1 3/4 3/4 3/4 3/4 1 2/4 1 1 3/4 3/4 3/4 3/4 1 1/2 1 1
1 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 0 1 1/2 0 1/2 0 1/2 0 1/2 0 1/2 0 1/2 0 1/2 0 1 0
2 0 2 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0
2 1 0 1/3 0 1/3 0 1/3 0 1/3 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1/3 0
2 1 1 5/6 1/2 2/3 1/3 2/3 1/3 5/6 2/3 1 1/2 1 1 1 1/2 1 1/3
2 1 2 1 1/3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/3
2 2 0 2/3 1/3 2/3 1/3 2/3 0 2/3 2/3 1 1 1 1 1 0 2/3 1/3
2 2 1 5/6 1/2 5/6 2/3 5/6 1/3 5/6 5/6 1 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 2/3
2 2 2 1 2/3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2/3
2 3 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
2 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1
2 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
B C A, B, C A, B, C A B C A, B, C
l1 l2 l3 Φ˜
3
1 Φ˜
3
0 Φ˜
3
1 Φ˜
3
0 Φ˜
4
1 Φ˜
4
0 Φ˜
5
1 Φ˜
5
0 Φ˜
5
1 Φ˜
5
0 Φ˜
5
1 Φ˜
5
0 Φ˜
6
1 Φ˜
6
0 Φ˜
7
1 Φ˜
7
0
0 1 2 0 0 1/3 0 1 0 2/3 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
0 2 1 1/3 0 2/3 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
0 2 2 1/3 1/3 2/3 1/3 1 1 1 1/3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 3 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
0 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 2 1/2 0 1/2 0 1 0 1 0 1/2 0 1/2 0 1/2 0 1 0
1 1 1 1/3 0 1/2 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
1 1 2 1/3 1/3 2/3 1/3 1 1 1 2/3 1 1/2 1 1 1 1/2 1 1
1 2 0 1/6 0 1/6 0 1 0 2/3 0 1/2 0 1/2 0 1 0 1 0
1 2 1 2/3 1/2 5/6 1/3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 2 2 2/3 2/3 5/6 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 3 0 1/2 1/2 1 0 1 1 1 1 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1 0 1 1
1 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 0 1 1 0 1 0 1/2 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
2 0 2 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1
2 1 0 1/3 0 1/3 0 1 0 1/3 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
2 1 1 1 2/3 1 1/3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 0 2/3 1/3 2/3 1/3 1 1 2/3 2/3 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
2 2 1 1 1 1 2/3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 3 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
2 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Table 2.9: The survival signatures of component of Type 1 in Case 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,
6 and 7
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D E F D E F D, E, F D
l1 l2 l3 Φ˜1 Φ˜0 Φ˜1 Φ˜0 Φ˜1 Φ˜0 Φ˜
1
1 Φ˜
1
0 Φ˜
1
1 Φ˜
1
0 Φ˜
1
1 Φ˜
1
0 Φ˜
2
1 Φ˜
2
0 Φ˜
3
1 Φ˜
3
0
0 1 2 1/2 0 1/2 0 1/2 0 1/2 0 1/2 0 1/2 0 1 0 1/2 0
0 2 1 1/2 0 1/2 0 1/2 0 1/2 0 1/2 0 1/2 0 1/2 0 1 0
0 2 2 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0
1 0 2 1/3 0 0 0 1/3 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 2/3 0 1/3 0
1 1 1 1/6 0 1/6 0 1/3 0 3/4 0 1/2 0 3/4 0 2/3 0 1/2 0
1 1 2 4/6 1/6 1/3 1/3 2/3 1/3 1 1/2 1 1 1 1/2 1 2/3 2/3 1/6
1 2 0 1/3 0 1/3 0 1/3 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1/3 0 1/3 0
1 2 1 5/6 3/6 2/3 1/3 2/3 1/3 1 1/2 1 1 1 1/2 5/6 2/3 1 1/3
1 2 2 1 1/3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/3
2 0 1 1/6 0 1/6 0 1/3 0 1/3 0 1/2 0 1 0 2/3 0 1/3 0
2 0 2 2/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 2/3 1/3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/3 2/3 1/3
2 1 0 1/6 0 1/6 0 1/6 0 1/2 0 1/2 0 1 0 2/3 0 1/6 0
2 1 1 6/12 3/12 5/12 4/12 7/12 2/12 3/4 3/4 3/4 3/4 1 1/2 5/6 2/3 5/6 1/2
2 1 2 5/6 3/6 4/6 4/6 5/6 3/6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 5/6 3/6
2 2 0 2/3 1/3 2/3 1/3 2/3 1/3 1 1 1 1 1 0 2/3 2/3 2/3 1/3
2 2 1 5/6 3/6 5/6 4/6 5/6 2/6 1 1 1 1 1 1/2 5/6 5/6 1 2/3
2 2 2 1 2/3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2/3
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
3 0 1 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1 1/2 1 1/2 1 1
3 0 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3 1 0 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1 0 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1 0 1 1 1/2 1/2
3 1 1 3/4 3/4 3/4 3/4 1 2/4 3/4 3/4 3/4 3/4 1 2/4 1 1 1 1
3 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3 2 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
3 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1
3 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
E F D, E, F D E F D, E, F D, E, F
l1 l2 l3 Φ˜
3
1 Φ˜
3
0 Φ˜
3
1 Φ˜
3
0 Φ˜
4
1 Φ˜
4
0 Φ˜
5
1 Φ˜
5
0 Φ˜
5
1 Φ˜
5
0 Φ˜
5
1 Φ˜
5
0 Φ˜
6
1 Φ˜
6
0 Φ˜
7
1 Φ˜
7
0
0 1 2 1/2 0 1/2 0 1 0 1/2 0 1/2 0 1/2 0 1 0 1 0
0 2 1 1 0 1 0 1/2 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
0 2 2 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
1 0 2 0 0 1/3 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 2/3 0 1 0
1 1 1 1/3 0 1/2 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
1 1 2 1/3 1/3 2/3 1/3 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1/2 1 2/3 1 1
1 2 0 1/3 0 1/3 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1/3 0 1 0
1 2 1 1 2/3 1 1/3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 0 1 1/3 0 2/3 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
2 0 2 1/3 1/3 2/3 1/3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/3 1 1
2 1 0 1/6 0 1/6 0 1 0 1/2 0 1/2 0 1 0 2/3 0 1 0
2 1 1 2/3 1/2 5/6 1/3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 1 2 4/6 4/6 5/6 3/6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 0 2/3 1/3 2/3 1/3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2/3 2/3 1 1
2 2 1 1 1 1 2/3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
3 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3 0 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3 1 0 1/2 1/2 1 0 1 1 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1 0 1 1 1 1
3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3 2 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
3 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Table 2.10: The survival signatures of component of Type 2 in Case 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,
6 and 7
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G H G H G H
l1 l2 l3 Φ˜1 Φ˜0 Φ˜1 Φ˜0 Φ˜
1
1 Φ˜
1
0 Φ˜
1
1 Φ˜
1
0 Φ˜
2
1 Φ˜
2
0 Φ˜
2
1 Φ˜
2
0
0 2 1 1/3 0 1/3 0 1/3 0 1/3 0 1 0 1 0
0 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
0 3 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0
1 1 1 2/9 0 2/9 0 2/3 0 2/3 0 2/3 0 2/3 0
1 2 0 1/9 0 1/9 0 1/3 0 1 0 1/3 0 1 0
1 2 1 5/9 3/9 5/9 1/9 1 1 1 1/3 1 1 1 1/3
1 3 0 1/3 1/3 1 1/3 1 1 1 1 1/3 1/3 1 1/3
1 3 1 1 1 1 1/3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/3
2 0 1 1/3 0 1/3 0 1 0 1 0 1/3 0 1/3 0
2 1 0 1/9 0 1/9 0 1/3 0 1 0 1/3 0 1 0
2 1 1 5/9 3/9 5/9 1/9 1 1 1 1/3 1 1 1 1/3
2 2 0 3/9 2/9 6/9 2/9 2/3 2/3 1 2/3 2/3 2/3 1 2/3
2 2 1 7/9 6/9 7/9 3/9 1 1 1 2/3 1 1 1 2/3
2 3 0 2/3 2/3 1 2/3 1 1 1 1 2/3 2/3 1 2/3
2 3 1 1 1 1 2/3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2/3
3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
3 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0
3 1 0 1/3 1/3 1 1/3 1/3 1/3 1 1/3 1 1 1 1
3 1 1 1 1 1 1/3 1 1 1 1/3 1 1 1 1
3 2 0 2/3 2/3 1 2/3 2/3 2/3 1 2/3 1 1 1 1
3 2 1 1 1 1 2/3 1 1 1 2/3 1 1 1 1
3 3 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
G, H G H G, H G, H G, H
l1 l2 l3 Φ˜
3
1 Φ˜
3
0 Φ˜
4
1 Φ˜
4
0 Φ˜
4
1 Φ˜
4
0 Φ˜
5
1 Φ˜
5
0 Φ˜
6
1 Φ˜
6
0 Φ˜
7
1 Φ˜
7
0
0 2 1 1/3 0 1 0 1 0 1/3 0 1 0 1 0
0 3 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
0 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 2/9 0 1 0 1 0 2/3 0 2/3 0 1 0
1 2 0 4/9 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
1 2 1 5/9 4/9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 3 0 1 1/3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/3 1 1
1 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 0 1 1/3 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1/3 0 1 0
2 1 0 4/9 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
2 1 1 5/9 4/9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 0 7/9 2/9 1 1 1 1 1 2/3 1 2/3 1 1
2 2 1 7/9 7/9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 3 0 1 2/3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2/3 1 1
2 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
3 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
3 1 0 1 1/3 1 1 1 1 1 1/3 1 1 1 1
3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3 2 0 1 2/3 1 1 1 1 1 2/3 1 1 1 1
3 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3 3 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Table 2.11: The survival signatures of component of Type 3 in Case 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,
6 and 7
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(c) Case 2
0 1 2 3 4
0.
00
0.
05
0.
10
0.
15
0.
20
0.
25
0.
30
0.
35
Time
R
I3
A
 B 
 C 
 D 
 E 
 F 
 G and H 
(d) Case 3
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(e) Case 4
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(f) Case 5
0 1 2 3 4
0.
00
0.
05
0.
10
0.
15
0.
20
0.
25
0.
30
Time
R
I6
A
 B 
 C 
 D, E and F 
 G and H 
(g) Case 6
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(h) Case 7
Figure 2.8: The relative importance indices of components in Figure 2.5
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2.4 Joint reliability importance (JRI)
We consider the joint reliability importance index JRI of components i and j, given
by the following equation:
JRIi,j(t) = P (TS > t|Ti > t, Tj > t)− P (TS > t|Ti > t, Tj ≤ t)
− P (TS > t|Ti ≤ t, Tj > t) + P (TS > t|Ti ≤ t, Tj ≤ t)
for t > 0 [8]. The joint reliability importance JRI is a measure of interaction
of the two components in a system with regard to their contribution to the system
reliability. The value of JRI indicates that one component is more or less important,
or has the same importance, when the other is functioning. If JRI > 0 then one
component becomes more important when the other is functioning (so they can be
regarded as ‘complements’). If JRI < 0 then one component becomes less important
when the other is functioning (‘substitutes’), while if JRI = 0 then one component’s
importance is unchanged by the functioning of the other [8]. We consider again the
influence of possible swaps on the joint reliability importance of components. The
importance measure and the approach considered in this section can be generalized
quite straightforwardly to joint importance of more than two components, but this
tends to be of less practical relevance. Computing the conditional survival functions
given the states of two components is again quite straightforward, and requires the
computation of the corresponding survival signatures. We illustrate this using the
same two systems and scenarios considered in Examples 2.2.1 and 2.2.5, and also in
Examples 2.3.1 and 2.3.2.
Example 2.4.1 We consider the JRI of each pair of components in Figure 2.1 for
the same swapping case introduced in Example 2.2.1. The joint reliability impor-
tance of components A and B in Case 0, in which there is no swapping possible, is
denoted by JRIA,B. Note that, given the states of these two components, the only
variable left is the number of functioning components of Type 2, so components C
and D, hence we can represent the survival signatures given the states of components
A and B as a function of only l2, the number of functioning components of Type 2.
Table 2.12 presents the survival signatures Φ˜1,1 (l2), Φ˜1,0 (l2), Φ˜0,1 (l2) and Φ˜0,0 (l2)
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l2 Φ˜1,1 Φ˜1,0 Φ˜0,1 Φ˜0,0
0 1 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 0
2 1 1 0 0
Table 2.12: Survival signatures given states of components A and B
in Case 0, where the first subscript represents the state of component A and the
second the state of component B.
The JRI for components A and B can be derived by
JRIA,B(t) =
2∑
l2=0
[
Φ1,1 (l2)− Φ˜1,0 (l2)− Φ˜0,1 (l2) + Φ˜0,0 (l2)
]
P (C2t = l2)
leading to
JRIA,B(t) = [F2(t)]
2
By the same method we derive
JRIA,C(t) = JRIA,D(t) = [F1(t)][F2(t)]
JRIB,C(t) = JRIB,D(t) = −[1− F1(t)][F2(t)]
JRID,C(t) = −[F1(t)][1− F1(t)]
These joint reliability indices are presented in Figure 2.9(a), where the same
component failure time distributions have been assumed as in Example 2.2.1. These
joint reliability indices will be compared to the similar indices in the case of compo-
nent swaps being possible later in this example.
We now consider the same possible component swap as in Example 2.2.1, that is
component B can take over the role of component A if needed. Let JRI1i,j(t) denote
the joint reliability importance of components i and j in Case 1, so with this swap
being possible. To calculate JRI1i,j(t), we first compute the four survival signatures
corresponding to this swap in Case 1 and conditioned on the respective states for
2.4. Joint reliability importance (JRI) 49
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Figure 2.9: JRI of each pair of components in Figure 2.1
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components i, j. This leads to the following results
JRI1A,B(t) =
[
2[F2(t)]
2
]− 1
JRI1A,C(t) = JRI
1
A,D(t) = JRI
1
B,C(t) = JRI
1
B,D(t) = [2F1(t)− 1][F2(t)]
JRI1D,C(t) = −2[F1(t)][1− F1(t)]
Figure 2.9(b) illustrate the JRI in Case 1. We can see that in Case 0, the pairs of
components (A,B), (A,C) and (A,D) are each complementary, while (B,C), (B,D)
and (D,C) are substitutes. It is clear by comparing these figures that the interaction
of each pair of components with regard to their contribution to the system reliability
is impacted by component swapping being possible. In particular, not all pairs are
complements or substitutes for all t anymore, where particularly the joint reliability
importance of the pair (A,B) is much affected by the swapping opportunity.
Example 2.4.2 For the system in Figure 2.5, discussed in Examples 2.2.5 and 2.3.2,
there are 28 pairs of components. We only briefly illustrate joint reliability impor-
tance for this system, by considering the JRI for components G and H in Cases 0,
2 and 3 considered before, namely Case 0 of no swaps being possible, Case 2 where
components D, E, F (Type 2) can be swapped, and Case 3 where components G and
H (Type 3) can be swapped. With the same component failure time distributions
assumed as in Example 2.2.5, Figure 2.10 presents these three JRIs. In Case 0 the
components G and H are complementary. The possible swapping in Case 2 has the
effect that components G and H become reliability substitutes. In Case 3, in which
we can swap these two components with each other, they become reliability comple-
ments until a specific time point and they become reliability substitutes after that
time, of course the precise times involved depends on the failure time distributions
of all components.
2.5 Concluding remarks
In this chapter, we have considered quantification of system reliability if some com-
ponents can be swapped upon failure. Based on the survival signature concept that
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Figure 2.10: JRI for components G and H in Figure 2.5
was introduced by [18], we introduced two different approaches to quantify the re-
liability of the system if its components can be swapped upon failure. In the first
approach the effect of a defined swapping regime is fully taken into account through
the system structure function, and hence the survival signature. In the second ap-
proach, the effect of such a component swap is taken into account through the failure
times of specific locations. While the same reliability information can be obtained
by both approaches, the first one is more attractive than the second one, since it has
continued with the same advantage of survival signature by modeling the structure
of systems and separating it from the random failure time of components. However,
in the second approach the lifetime distributions become extremely complex and
may not be feasible if one has a variety of swapping opportunities. This thesis con-
siders only the first approach for reliability assessment if some components can be
swapped. We considered component importance, which was particularly simplified
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by the use of the survival signature.
The approach of increasing system reliability through swapping components
upon failure that is proposed in this chapter is quite interesting since it makes
the system resilient to possible faults and it will not increase the weight and vol-
ume of the system. This approach can be used in the systems that are not easily
accessible for repair and replacements and it could enable preparation of substantial
repair activities. What is more important and needs to be emphasized is that, in
the proposed approach, the reliability and number of the components don’t need to
be increased to improve the reliability of the system.
A further interesting topic for future research is the possibility to swap compo-
nents when they are all still functioning. This could be attractive if one has the
opportunity to swap components of different types where a critical component may,
while still functioning, be swapped with another component at a certain time if they
have different hazard rates over time. For example, a component with increasing
hazard rate may be best to use in a critical part of the system in early stages, to
then be swapped by a component with decreasing hazard rate to improve system re-
liability at later stages. Further research also is to study the contribution that swaps
can make to system resilience in comparison to other activities, including more in-
built redundancy, standby components,or maintenance and replacement activities.
It could also consider other importance measures.
The effect of the swapping of components is entirely reflected through the change
in the survival signature. It may be of interest to investigate whether or not this
change can also be reflected by a distortion of the component reliabilities [59], which
may provide a further tool for comparison of different systems and different swapping
routines. It has been shown that very efficient simulation methods can be based on
the survival signature [49]. The same simulation method can perhaps also be used
to only learn about difference in reliability for two swapping regimes.
The approach presented in this thesis requires repeated calculation of survival
signatures. Aslett [6] has created a function in the statistical software R to com-
pute the survival signature, given a graphical presentation of the system structure.
This will be necessary for our work for systems that are not very small, and it will
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be of interest to create a tool that can automatically compute all the survival sig-
natures required in case of a substantial system with many component swapping
opportunities.
Chapter 3
Cost effective component
swapping to increase system
reliability
3.1 Introduction
In Chapter 2, we have used the concept of survival signature to quantify the re-
liability of systems when there is a possibility to swap components upon failure.
Swapping components, if possible, is likely to incur some costs, for example for the
actual swap or to prepare components to be able to take over functionality of an-
other component. In this chapter, we consider the cost effectiveness of component
swapping over a fixed period of time, and also over an unlimited time horizon from
the perspective of renewal theory [64]. In Section 3.2, we consider the cost effec-
tiveness of component swapping under the assumption that a system would need to
function for a given period of time, where failure to achieve this incurs a penalty
cost. The expected penalty costs of system failure when the different swap scenar-
ios are applicable are compared with the option not to enable swaps. In Section
3.3, we study the cost effectiveness of component swapping from the perspective of
renewal theory. We assume that the system is entirely renewed upon failure, at a
known cost, and we compare different swapping scenarios. We also study the effect
of components swapping on possible preventive replacement actions. We end this
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chapter with some concluding remarks in Section 3.4.
3.2 Penalty costs for system failure with compo-
nent swapping
In this section, we consider the cost effectiveness of component swapping over a
fixed period of time under the assumption that a system would need to function
for a given period of time, where failure to achieve this incurs a penalty cost. We
consider time independent penalty costs in Section 3.2.1 and time dependent penalty
cost in Section 3.2.2.
3.2.1 Time independent penalty costs
Suppose that we have a system which needs to function for a fixed period of time
[0, τ ]. If the system fails at any time t before the fixed time τ , a penalty cost needs
to be paid. This penalty cost is fixed, independent of the failure time, and denoted
by cp. Let TS denote the random failure time of the system, so R(τ) = P (TS ≥ τ),
is the probability that the system functions, and 1 − R(τ) = P (TS < τ) is the
probability that the system fails before τ . We refer to the situation in which there
is no swapping opportunity as Case 0. Let C(τ) denote the expected cost of failure
of system in Case 0, then
C(τ) = cp(1−R(τ)) (3.2.1)
We assume that the system can benefit from different swapping opportunities if
it fails before τ . An upfront cost may need to be paid out to enable each swapping
opportunity. Let cw denote the cost to enable swap Case w. We need to consider
up front which opportunity of swapping cases will minimize the expected cost. The
probability that the system survives until τ if a specified swapping regime is applica-
ble defined by Rw(τ). Let Cw(τ) denote the expected cost if the specified swapping
regime is applicable, then
Cw(τ) = cw + cp(1−Rw(τ)) (3.2.2)
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3.2.2 Time dependent penalty costs
In this section we assume that the penalty costs that need to be paid if the system
fails before a fixed time τ is dependent on the failure time. Let cu represents the cost
per unit of time if the system does not function in the period [0, τ ]. If the system
fails at time TS ∈ [0, τ ], then the downtime is τ −TS and the downtime cost is equal
to cu(τ −TS). Let C(τ) denote the expected cost in Case 0, so, C(τ) = cuE(τ −TS).
We assume that F (0) = 0, so the system functions at t = 0. We have
E(τ − TS) =
∫ τ
0
(τ − t)f(t)dt = τ [F (τ)− F (0)]−
∫ τ
0
tf(t)dt (3.2.3)
To find
∫ τ
0
tf(t)dt, let us substitute t =
∫ t
0
du, so,
∫ τ
0
tf(t)dt =
∫ τ
0
∫ t
0
f(t)dudt =
∫ τ
0
∫ τ
u
f(t)dtdu =∫ τ
0
F (τ)− F (u)du =
∫ τ
0
(F (τ)− 1)du+
∫ τ
0
(1− F (u))du =
τF (τ)− τ +
∫ τ
0
R(u)du (3.2.4)
Substituting the result from Equation (3.2.4) to Equation (3.2.3), we get
E(τ − TS) = τ −
∫ τ
0
R(u)du
Therefore, the expected cost in Case 0 is
C(τ) = cu
[
τ −
∫ τ
0
R(t)dt
]
(3.2.5)
If the system can benefit from different swapping cases if it fails at any time before
τ , with an upfront cost cw to enable the specified swaps, the expected cost with the
specified swaps in place, Cw(τ), is equal to
Cw(τ) = cw + cu
[
τ −
∫ τ
0
Rw(t)dt
]
(3.2.6)
where Rw(τ) is the reliability of the system if the specified swaps is applicable.
Example 3.2.1 Consider again the system in Figure 2.1 and the same swapping
possibility as discussed in Example 2.2.1. We refer to the original case of the system
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Figure 3.1: Cost with fixed penalty for the system in Figure 2.1
when there is no swapping possible between components as in Case 0. We refer to
the case when components A and B can be swapped as Case 1. We use the same
failure time distributions for Type 1 and Type 2 components as in Example 2.2.1,
so the system has the same reliability in Cases 0 and 1 as in Example 2.2.1. Assume
that the system needs to continue functioning for the period of time [0, 0.5], if the
system fails in this period, a fixed penalty cost cp = 200 needs to be paid. Let the
cost to enable the swap in Case 1 be c1 = 8. We want to compare the expected cost
in Cases 0 and 1. The expected cost in Case 0 is C(0.5) = 49.57 and the expected
cost in Case 1 is C1(0.5) = 28.45, which means that when τ = 0.5, it is good to
take the opportunity of the swap in Case 1. Figure 3.1 illustrates how the expected
cost in Cases 0 and 1, change depending on the value of τ . The opportunity of the
swap in Case 1, minimizes the expected cost only if 0.21 < τ < 1.48, because if τ is
small, failure is unlikely and if τ is large, failure is very likely even with the swap in
Case 1.
Now assume that the penalty cost depends on the system failure time, and the
cost per unit of time is cu = 100. In this case, the cost in Case 0 is C(0.5) = 4.20,
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Figure 3.2: Cost with time dependent penalty for the system in Figure 2.1
and the cost in Case 1 is C1(0.5) = 9.17, which means that when τ = 0.5, the
opportunity of the swap in Case 1 will increase the expected cost. However, when
τ = 1, we have C(1) = 28.91 and C1(1) = 25.63, which means that the expected cost
has decreased with the opportunity of the swap, so it is good to enable the swap.
Figure 3.2 illustrates how the expected cost in Cases 0 and 1 changes, depending
on the value of τ . It clear that if τ is small, the system is unlikely to fail, while for
large τ the system is likely to fail but the swapping case delayed the failure time,
leading to lower penalty costs.
Example 3.2.2 For the system in Figure 2.5, 7 possible swap cases are discussed
in Example 2.2.5. In this example, we only consider the swap Cases 0, 2, 3 and 5,
namely Case 0 of no swaps being possible, Case 2 where components D, E, F (Type
2) can be swapped, Case 3 where components G and H (Type 3) can be swapped,
and in Case 5 where both Type 2 and Type 3 components can be swapped. In each
case the swap can be done only between components of the same type. With the
same component failure time distributions assumed as in Example 2.2.5, the system
reliability in Cases 0, 2, 3 and 5 are given in Example 2.2.5.
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Figure 3.3: Cost with fixed penalty for the system in Figure 2.5
Assume that, if the system fails before the fixed time τ = 1, the penalty cost is
fixed and is cp = 200. The costs to enable swapping Cases 2, 3 and 5 are c2 = 10,
c3 = 5 and c5 = 15, respectively. The expected cost in Case 0 is C(1) = 157.53,
and the expected cost in Cases 2, 3 and 5 are C2(1) = 142.00, C3(1) = 152.98 and
C5(1) = 130.30, respectively, which means that the opportunity of swapping Case
5 should be taken to minimize the expected cost. We plot C(τ), C2(τ), C3(τ) and
C5(τ) as functions of τ in Figure 3.3. It is clear from this figure that for values of
τ it is either optimal not to prepare for any swaps (τ < 0.24 or τ > 1.37), or to
prepare for swap Case 5 (0.29 < τ < 1.37), this is explained by the same reason as
discussed in Example 3.2.1.
Let cu = 100. If τ = 1, the expected costs in Cases 0, 2, 3 and 5 are C(1) = 31.54,
C2(2) = 30.24, C3(1) = 31.59, and C5(1) = 30.37, respectively. Thus, to minimize
the expected cost is better to take the opportunity of the swap Case 2. If τ = 2,
the expected cost in Case 0 is C(1) = 126.06, and the expected cost in Cases 2,
3 and 5 are C2(2) = 120.72, C3(2) = 124.77 and C5(2) = 117.96, respectively, so
to minimize the expected cost in this case we should prepare for swapping Case 5.
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Figure 3.4: Cost with time dependent penalty for the system in Figure 2.5
Figure 3.4 illustrates how the expected cost in cases 0, 2, 3 and 5 would change
depending on the value of τ .
3.3 Optimal swapping based on renewal theory
In the previous section we considered the cost effectiveness of component swapping
over a fixed period of time. In this section we consider the cost effectiveness of
component swapping over an unlimited time horizon from the perspective of renewal
theory.
Renewal theory is a well-known theory that has a wide application in the lit-
erature of Operational Research and Reliability see e.g. [20–22, 51, 66]. Renewal
theory deals with successive occurrences of events in terms of random variables. A
typical application of renewal theory is in failure or maintenance models. A system
is installed at time 0. If it failed at some random time T1 > 0, it is replaced by
a new system. The new system lasts for a second random time T2, with the same
distribution as T1 > 0. The same process goes on for an undefined length of time.
This replacement process might be considered in general either because the system
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is not accessible for repair or the cost of repairs are higher than the cost of replace-
ment. An example of the system may be something simple like a light-bulb, or it
may be something more complicated like a hard disk for an internet server or a GPS
satellite.
Many applications of renewal theory involve rewards or cost. The optimal reward
or cost per unit of time over a very long period of time is derived by renewal reward
theory [9], assuming that the same process goes on for infinity or undefined length
of time. In practice, although one acknowledges the fact that assuming such a long
period for the same process may not be realistic, renewal reward theory is still often
considered attractive and reasonable since it provides a mathematically convenient
way to compute the optimal costs per unit of time.
Here are some mathematical definitions. Suppose that the same process goes
on for infinity or undefined length of time. This process is assumed to consist of
consecutive cycles which are stochastic copies of each other. T1, T2, T3, · · · is a
sequence of independently and identically distributed random variable representing
the length of the cycles. Ti represents the length of the cycle i, 0 ≤ Ti ≤ ∞ and
it indicates the time between the occurrence of the (i − 1)th and the ith events
(renewals). It is assumed that these random variables have a known probability
distribution, with CDF F (t) = P (Ti 6 t), t > 0, i = 1, 2, · · · , probability density
function (pdf) f(t), reliability function R(t) = P (Ti > t) and expected value 0 <
E(Ti) < ∞. The time to the ith renewal, denoted by Si, is Si =
∑i
k=1 Ti. The
number of renewals up to time t is denoted by the random variable N(t) and is
equal to the largest integer i > 0 for which Si 6 t. N(t) is called a renewal counting
process [64].
Let Wi be a random cost associated with i cycle. It is assumed that the sequence
of random variable W1,W2, · · · are i.i.d, but dependence of Wi on Ti is possible. The
accumulative costs up to time t are denoted by W (t), so W (t) =
∑N(t)
i=1 Wi and W (t)
is called a renewal reward process. The long run average reward cost per unit of
time, g, for a renewal reward process is given by the reward reward theory [64],
g = lim
t→∞
W (t)
t
=
E[Wi]
E[Ti]
(3.3.7)
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Assume that we have a system that is entirely renewed upon failure for a long
period of time. The reliability of this system might be enhanced by component
swapping. Some components that are tasked with minor functions can be prepared
to take over crucial functions in case another component fails. Let T denote the
system random failure time. If the system is entirely renewed upon failure, the
length between renewals is equal to the random failure time of the system T . R(t) =
P (T > t) is the reliability of the system. The expected failure time of the system is
E[T ] =
∫∞
0
tf(t)dt =
∫∞
0
R(t)dt. If this system is entirely renewed upon failure at
a known cost cf , then the expected renewal cost is E[W ] = cf . Therefore, the long
run average cost per unit of time, g, for the renewal system, is given by
g =
cf∫∞
0
R(t)dt
(3.3.8)
If we assume that the system can benefit upon failure of its components from
a defined component swap. Tw is the random failure time of the system when the
defined swap is applicable. Tw represents the length of time between renewals when
the defined swap is applicable. The reliability of the system if the defined swap is
applicable is Rw(t) = P (Tw > t). Let cw be an upfront cost needed to be paid to
enable the defined swap. The long run average cost per unit of time for the renewal
system if the defined swap is applicable is denoted by gw, and is given by
gw =
cf + cw∫∞
0
Rw(t)dt
(3.3.9)
3.3.1 Preventive Replacement
A well known application of renewal reward theory is age replacement [64]. Age
replacement requires a system to be renewed when it reaches a specified age Ar > 0
(preventive replacement) or if it fails prior the specified age Ar (corrective replace-
ment), in a manner that is most cost-effective. The optimal preventive replacement
age is the one that leads to the minimum expected costs per unit of time and is
derived from applying the renewal reward theory [9].
Assume that the system is entirely renewed upon reaching a specified age Ar at
a known cost cr > 0, or upon failure at a known cost cf > cr. The cost per renewal
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is cr with probability R(Ar) and cf with probability [1 − R(Ar)], so the expected
renewal cost E[W ] = crR(Ar)+cf [1−R(Ar)]. The length between renewals is equal
to min(TS, Ar). Thus, the expected length between renewal is E[min(TS, Ar)] =∫∞
0
min(t, Ar)f(t)dt =
∫ Ar
0
tf(t)dt+Ar
∫∞
Ar
f(t)dt =
∫ Ar
0
R(t)dt. Thus, the long run
average cost per unit of time, g(Ar), is given by
g(Ar) =
crR(Ar) + cf [1−R(Ar)]∫ Ar
0
R(t)dt
(3.3.10)
If we assume that upon failure the system components can be swapped, then
the expected length between renewals is E[min(Tw, Ar)] =
∫ Ar
0
Rw(t)dt and the
expected renewal costs are E[W ] = crR
w(Ar) + cf [1−Rw(Ar)]. If the cost to enable
a defined swap is cw per cycle, then the long run average cost per unit of time for
strategy Ar if the defined swap is applicable, g
w(Ar), is given by
gw(Ar) =
crR
w(Ar) + cf [1−Rw(Ar)] + cw∫ Ar
0
Rw(t)dt
(3.3.11)
It is clear from Equations (3.3.10) and (3.3.11) that the expected costs per unit
of time depend on the renewal time, so we can find the optimal renewal time for the
system in case there is no swap possible by setting
dg(Ar)
dAr
= 0, and in the case of
possible swap by setting
dgw(Ar)
dAr
= 0.
Example 3.3.1 Consider again the system in Figure 2.1 and the same swapping
possibility as discussed in Example 2.2.1. We refer to original case of the system
when there is no swapping possible between components as Case 0. We refer to the
case when components A and B can be swapped as Case 1. We use the same failure
time distributions for Type 1 and Type 2 components as in Example 2.2.1, so the
system has the same reliability in Cases 0 and 1 as Example 2.2.1. We assume that
the system is entirely renewed upon failure at the cost cf = 200. The long run
average cost per unit of time of the original system is g = 253.01, and in Case 1 is
g1 = 217.96. Therefore, taking the opportunity of Case 1 swapping will minimize
the expected cost per unit of time for the renewal system. In Figure 3.7, we plot the
long run average cost per unit of time as a function of renewal cost, cf . It is clear
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Figure 3.5: The long run average cost for the system in Figure 2.1
from this figure that if cf > 38.60, it is good to take the opportunity of the swap
but if cf ≤ 38.60, it is good not to take the swap opportunity.
Assume that preventive replacement is possible on this system when it is reaching
a specified age Ar at cost cr = 30, and if the system fails before Ar then the renewal
cost upon failure is cf = 200. Figure 3.8 presents the expected costs per unit of
time in Cases 0 and 1, depending on the value of Ar. The points in this figure show
the optimal renewal times. The optimal renewal time in Case 0 is Ar = 0.38 with
corresponding minimum cost g = 151.70. In Case 1 the optimal renewal time is
Ar = 0.48 with corresponding minimum cost g
1 = 113.31. It clear that enabling
this swap delays the optimal renewal time and reduces the costs.
Example 3.3.2 For the system in Figure 2.5, we again, consider as in Example
3.2.2 consider only the swap Cases 0, 2, 3 and 5 which we discussed in Example
2.2.5. Assume the same component failure time distributions as in Example 2.2.5,
so the system reliabilities in Cases 0, 2, 3 and 5 are the same as in Example 2.2.5.
Assume that the system is entirely renewed upon failure at the cost cf = 200. The
long run average cost per unit of time in Cases 0, 2, 3, and 5 are g = 270.06,
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Figure 3.6: The cost with the preventive replacement for the system in Figure 2.1
g2 = 234.50, g3 = 255.09, and g5 = 220.85, respectively. It is clear that if cf = 200,
taking the opportunity of any of the swap cases would minimize the cost, however,
the maximum reduction in the cost is obtained by swap Case 5 followed by Case 2
then Case 3. In Figure 3.7, we present the long run average cost per unit of time
as a function of cf . We can see that if cf ≤ 47.69, is better not to prepare for any
swaps, but if cf > 47.69 is good to prepare for the swap Case 5.
Assume now that the preventive replacement cost is cr = 30 and the corrective
replacement cost cf = 200. Figure 3.8 illustrates how the expected costs per unit of
time in Cases 0, 2, 3 and 5 depends on the value of Ar. The points in this figure show
the optimal renewal times. The optimal renewal times in Cases 0, 2, 3 and 5 are
Ar = 0.3443592, Ar = 0.4660438, Ar = 0.3952356 and Ar = 0.529294, respectively,
and the minimum costs associated with these renewal times are g = 151.9113,
g2 = 122.3783, g3 = 139.5121 and g5 = 113.3712. Thus, enabling swapping Case 5
minimizes the expected costs and delays the optimal replacement time.
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Figure 3.7: The long run average cost for the system in Figure 2.5
3.4 Concluding remarks
In this chapter we have discussed the cost effectiveness of component swapping over a
fixed period of time. We derive two models (time independent and time dependent)
of penalty costs of a system, in order to compare the expected costs for the system
when there is a possibility to swap components with the option not to enable swaps.
The cost effectiveness of component swapping over an unlimited time horizon
is also discussed from the perspective of renewal theory. It is assumed that the
system is entirely renewed upon failure, at a known cost. The expected cost per
unit of time for the renewal system when there are different swapping scenarios
are compared with the option not to enable swaps, focusing on minimum expected
costs. In addition, we discussed the meaningful effect that component swapping
might have on the preventive replacement actions.
The results in this chapter show that although an upfront cost might need to be
paid to enable each swapping scenario, the operation of component swapping might
contribute significantly in reducing the expected cost of the system. The indicators
in this chapter are useful in security assessment and risk management under the
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Figure 3.8: The cost with the preventive replacement for the system in Figure 2.5
constraint of cost.
Further interesting topics for future research are different cost structures and
consideration of choice between swapping components, standby, spares and mainte-
nance activities based on corresponding costs. It may also consider the possibility
to combine components swapping with inspection models [10].
Chapter 4
Phased mission systems with
components swapping
4.1 Introduction
A phased mission system (PMS) is defined as a system which performs a series of
tasks in consecutive and non-overlapping periods (phases). In order for this system
to accomplish its mission successfully, each phase has to be completed without any
failure [68]. Therefore, the reliability of a PMS is the probability that the system
functions in all phases.
An example of such a system is an aircraft flight which can be divided into
three phases, namely take-off phase, cruise phase and landing phase. Each of these
phases has completely different reliability requirements and behaviour. A distinct
feature of a PMS is that the system configuration varies between phases while the
component failures in different phases are mutually dependent. This feature makes
the reliability analysis of PMS more complex than the reliability analysis of a single
phase system.
Over the past few decades, there has been extensive research to analyse the relia-
bility of a PMS. Some researchers focus on modelling the dependence among system
components using state-based approaches, which are based on Markov models or
Petri nets [13, 17, 26, 40]. Other approaches are based on combinatorial methods,
such as binary decision diagram (BDD) or multi-valued decision diagram (MDD)
68
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based models [53, 62, 63, 70]. Recently, a new combinatorial analytical approach
providing a new survival signature methodology for reliability analysis of PMSs has
been introduced [37]. This method has similar computational complexity to BDD
methods, but for the first time brings all the advantages associated with the compact
representation of a system provided by the survival signature to PMS. This method
shows that the survival signature can be used for reliability analysis of PMS with
similar types of components in each phase. It keeps the attractive survival signature
property of separating the system structure from the component lifetime distribu-
tions, simplifying computation of insight into, and inference for system reliability.
It is often difficult for a PMS to work with high reliability. Generally, there are
mainly two approaches that can be used to improve the reliability of the PMS and
to prevent them from failure. The first way is increasing the component reliability
(reliability allocation), and the other way is using redundant components in parallel
(redundancy allocation) e.g. [3,23,43,50]. Unfortunately, these two approaches will
increase the cost of the PMS and do not always yield competitive results.
In this chapter, we extend the strategy of swapping components upon failure
that was introduced in Chapter 2, to improve the reliability of PMS and to make
them more resilient to component failure. We assume that if a component fails, it
can be swapped by another one which is still functioning in order to prevent the
PMS from failing. In addition, in this chapter we discuss another strategy that could
be used to improve the reliability of PMS, which is swapping components according
to structure importance. The structure importance is first used to measure the
importance level of the components in contributing to system reliability, then when
a component with high importance fails, it is swapped by another component in
the system with lower importance which has not yet failed. In the strategy where
if the components are swapped according to the structure importance, the swap
will take place with disregard to whether the system can continue to function with
the existing components in place or not, depending on the level of the importance
of the component that is failed. However, in the strategy that if the components
are swapped upon failure, the swap between component is done to prevent the
PMS from the failure, so the swap takes place only when the PMS cannot continue
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functioning with the existing components in place. The swap between components
in both strategies is logically restricted to components of the same type.
It is attractive if we can consider the possibility of swaping components at any
time during the mission. However, this cannot be realized in some PMSs, in which
the swap between components can be done only at transitions of phases. In this
chapter, we use the survival signature methodology as introduced by [37] to study
the effect of swapping components in both strategies, that is swapping components
upon failure and swapping component according to reliability importance, on the
PMS reliability when the components can be swapped at any time during the mission
or only at transitions of phases.
In this chapter we also extend the established cost models, presented in Chapter
3, to evaluate the expected costs of the failure of the PMS if there is a possibility to
swap components at any time during the mission or only at transitions of phases,
under the assumption that each phase of the system would need to complete its
mission successfully, where failure to achieve this incurs a penalty cost allocated to
each phase of not performing its mission. We consider two types of penalty costs,
namely, time independent and time dependent costs. The expected costs when the
two different scenarios of swapping possibilities are applicable are compared with
the option not to enable swaps.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 presents a brief background on
phased mission systems. Section 4.3 considers the effect of swapping components
upon failure on the PMS reliability under the two scenarios of swapping possibili-
ties. Section 4.4 presents the effect of swapping components according to reliability
importance on the PMS reliability, considering the two scenarios of swapping possi-
bilities. Section 4.5 demonstrates two cost models to analyse the expected costs of
the failure of the PMS if the components can be swapped at any time during the
mission or only at transitions of phases. In each section, we illustrate the proposed
strategies through numerical examples. We end this chapter with some concluding
remarks.
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4.2 Phased mission systems
A PMS performing a sequence of functions or tasks during consecutive phases to
accomplish a specific mission. Generally, in a PMS, each phase corresponds to one
configuration and the configuration changes from phase to phase. The states of the
same component in different phases are mutually dependent. The PMS might have
the same components in each phase or the components might vary from phase to
phase. In this chapter we consider only PMSs with the same components used in
each phase. What is important and needs to be emphasized is that, in this thesis,
both the system and its components are assumed to be non-repairable during the
mission, so if a component fails to function at the end of a certain phase, then it
cannot work again in subsequent phases.
Consider a PMS with n components in each phase, with N ≥ 2 phases. The
state of component j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} in phase i, i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N} can be represented
as a binary variable Xi,j
Xi,j =
1 component j is functioning in phase i0 component j is failed in phase i (4.2.1)
The state of the system in phase i can then be described by a binary function
φi = φi(Xi) = φi(Xi,1, · · · , Xi,n) (4.2.2)
where φi = 1 represents that the system successfully works for the entire phase i
and φi = 0 represents failure to do so. The vector Xi = (Xi,1, ..., Xi,n) represents
the states of all components at the end of phase i.
Similarly, the structure function of the PMS is also a binary variable which is com-
pletely determined by the states of all the components during the mission
φs = φs(X) = φs(X1,1, · · · , X1,n, · · · , XN,1, · · · , XN,n) (4.2.3)
where X = (X1, ..., XN) = (X1,1, ..., X1,n, ..., XN,1, ..., XN,n) is the state vector of the
components during the entire phased mission. Because a PMS is functioning if and
only if all its phases are completed without failure, the structure function of the
PMS can be written as
φs =
N∏
i=1
φi(Xi,1, · · · , Xi,n) (4.2.4)
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When φs = 1, this would provide a logical expression for the functioning of the
system, while φs = 0 provides an expression for the failure of the system.
4.3 Swapping components upon failure
In this section, we consider the strategy of swapping components upon failure to
increase PMS reliability under two scenarios of possibilities. First, we assume that
if a component fails at any time during the mission, it can be swapped by another one
which is still functioning. Secondly, we assume that the possibilities of component
swapping can occur only at transitions of phases, which means that when a PMS
fails during a certain phase, then no immediate swapping opportunities exist, so the
system fails. The swap between components is logically restricted to components
of the same type. We further assume here that such a swap of components can
be done only when the system cannot function with the existing components in
place. Section 4.3.1 considers the effect of swapping components upon failure on
PMS with single type of components. Section 4.3.2 considers the effect of swapping
components upon failure on PMS with multiple types of components.
4.3.1 PMS with single type of components
In this section we consider the simplest case in which a system with n components
of the same type that performs a N ≥ 2 phase mission. Phase i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}
runs from time τi−1 to time τi with τ0 = 0 and τi−1 < τi∀i. The survival signature
ΦS (l1, l2, ...lN) denotes the probability that the PMS functions by the end of the
mission given that precisely li, i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}, of its components functioned in
phase i. It is assumed that the random failure times of components in the same
phase are fully independent and exchangeable [37]. If N(t) ≤ N is the phase that the
system is in at time t, the survival signature of the first N(t) phases ΦS
(
l1, l2, ...lN(t)
)
is equal to
ΦS
(
l1, l2, ...lN(t)
)
=
N(t)∏
i=1
(
mi
li
)−1×∑
X∈S
φs (X) (4.3.1)
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where S denotes the set of all possible state vectors for which li components function
in phase i, and mi is the number of components that function at the beginning of
phase i. Because both the system and its components are non-repairable during the
mission, the number of components that function at the beginning of phase i should
be equal to the number of components that function at the end of phase i− 1. So,
mi = li−1 while m1 = n [37]. The reliability of the PMS at time t is given by
R(t) =
m1∑
l1=0
...
mN(t)∑
lN(t)=0
ΦS(l1, ...lN(t))P
N(t)⋂
i=1
{Ci(t) = li}
 (4.3.2)
where Ci(t) denotes the number of components that function in phase i at time
t ∈ [τi−1, τi) [37].
In this chapter we consider only PMS with the same components in each phase,
which means that all components appear in all phases and they age together. If the
components have a common CDF F (t), its conditional CDF in phase i is Fi(t) at
time t ∈ [τi−1, τi), conditioned on the system working at the beginning of phase i,
this is conditional CDF
Fi(t) =P (T < t|τi−1, τi, T > τi−1)
=
1
1− F (τi−1)
∫ min{t,τi}
τi−1
dF (z)
=
F (min {t, τi})− F (τi−1)
1− F (τi−1) (4.3.3)
where τi−1 is the start time of phase i, τ0 ≡ 0, and T is the random variable represents
the component lifetime. From Equation (4.3.3), the last part of Equation (4.3.2)
can be simplified as
P
N(t)⋂
i=1
{Ci(t) = li}
 = N(t)∏
i=1
P (Ci(t) = li) =
N(t)∏
i=1
((
mi
li
)
[1− Fi(t)]li [Fi(t)]mi−li
)
(4.3.4)
Thus, the reliability of the PMS at time t can be rewritten as
R(t) =
m1∑
l1=0
...
mN(t)∑
lN(t)=0
ΦS(l1, ...lN(t))N(t)∏
i=1
((
mi
li
)
[1− Fi(t)]li [Fi(t)]mi−li
) (4.3.5)
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where
Fi(t) =
F (min {t, τi})− F (τi−1)
1− F (τi−1) (4.3.6)
is the conditional CDF of the components at time t ∈ [τi−1, τi) in phase i for
i = 1, 2, · · · , N(t) [37]. It is conditioning on the component having worked at the
beginning of phase i.
From Equation (4.3.5), we can see that the survival signature of the PMS has
the same advantage as the survival signature of a single phased mission, that is it
takes into account the structure of the PMS and separates it from the conditional
failure time distributions of the components.
As in Section 2.2, we assume that there are fixed swapping rules, which prescribe
upon failure of a component precisely which other component takes over its role in
the system, if possible and if the other component is still functioning, in order to
prevent system from the failure, and we further assume that such a swap of compo-
nents takes neglectable time and does not affect the functioning of the component
that changes its role in the PMS nor its remaining time until failure. We can take
the effect of the defined swaps if they are applicable at any time during the mission
or only at transitions of phases, into account through the PMS structure function,
and hence, it can be taken into account for computation of the system reliability
through the PMS survival signature. Let Φ
(W )
S
(
l1, l2, ...lN(t)
)
denote the PMS sur-
vival signature if the defined swaps are applicable at any time during the mission
and Φ
(E)
S
(
l1, l2, ...lN(t)
)
denote the PMS survival signature if the defined swaps are
applicable only at transitions of phases,
Φ
(W )
S
(
l1, l2, ...lN(t)
)
=
N(t)∏
i=1
(
mi
li
)−1×∑
X∈S
φ(W )s (X) (4.3.7)
Φ
(E)
S
(
l1, l2, ...lN(t)
)
=
N(t)∏
i=1
(
mi
li
)−1×∑
X∈S
φ(E)s (X) (4.3.8)
where φ
(W )
s (X) is the structure function of the PMS considering the defined swaps
at any time during the mission and φ
(E)
s (X) is the structure function of the PMS
considering the the defined swaps only at transitions of phases, φ
(E)
s will be typically
equal to 1 for some X for which φs was equal to 0 and φ
(W )
s will typically be equal
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Figure 4.1: A PMS with single type of components
to 1 for some X for which φ
(E)
s was equal to 0, so φ
(W )
s ≥ φ(E)s ≥ φs. The reliability
of PMS can be calculated straightforwardly in both scenarios by substituting the
survival signature of the original PMS in (Equation 4.3.5) by the survival signatures
that consider the swapping scenarios in Equations (4.3.7) and (4.3.8).
R(W )(t) =
m1∑
l1=0
...
mN(t)∑
lN(t)=0
Φ(W )S (l1, ...lN(t))N(t)∏
i=1
((
mi
li
)
[1− Fi(t)]li [Fi(t)]mi−li
) (4.3.9)
R(E)(t) =
m1∑
l1=0
...
mN(t)∑
lN(t)=0
Φ(E)S (l1, ...lN(t))N(t)∏
i=1
((
mi
li
)
[1− Fi(t)]li [Fi(t)]mi−li
) (4.3.10)
where R(W )(t) is the reliability of the PMS if the defined swaps are applicable at
any during the mission and R(E)(t) is the reliability of the PMS at time t if the
defined swaps are applicable only at transitions of phases. The conditional CDF of
the components, Fi(t), at time t ∈ [τi−1, τi) in phase i for i = 1, 2, · · · , N(t), is given
by Equation (4.3.6). This CDF is conditioning on the component having worked at
the beginning of phase i.
It is important to notice here that the swap in both scenarios is entirely reflected
in the PMS survival signature, and the conditional failure time of the components
remains the same as for the original system. The following example explains this
approach in more detail.
Example 4.3.1 Consider the PMS in Figure 4.1 that consists of three components
performing a three-phase mission. All the components are of the same type and work
independently from one another in each phase. The duration of all three phases are
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The first phase The first two phases The PMS
0 ≤ t ≤ 10− 10+ ≤ t ≤ 20− 20+ ≤ t ≤ 30
l1 Φ1 Φ
(W )
1 Φ
(E)
1 l1 l2 Φ1,2 Φ
(W )
1,2 Φ
(E)
1,2 l1 l2 l3 ΦS Φ
(W )
S Φ
(E)
S
1 1/3 2/3 1/3 2 2 2/3 1 1 2 2 2 1/3 1 1
2 1 1 1 3 2 2/3 1 2/3 3 2 2 1/3 1 2/3
3 1 1 1 3 3 1 1 1 3 3 2 2/3 1 2/3
3 3 3 1 1 1
Table 4.1: Survival signatures of PMS shown in Example 4.3.1
10 hours each. All components in each phase are of the same type and the lifetime
distribution of the components in each phase follows an Exponential distribution
and the failure rates of phases 1, 2 and 3 are 2 × 10−3/hour, 1 × 10−4/hour and
2× 10−4/hour, respectively.
We want to examine the reliability of this PMS if components 1 and 2 can be
swapped upon failure at any time during the mission or only at transitions of phases.
The survival signature for the original PMS is calculated by Equation(4.3.1) and the
survival signature if components 1 and 2 are swappable upon failure at any time
during the mission or only at transitions of phases are calculated by Equation(4.3.7)
and Equation(4.3.8), respectively. In both scenarios, the opportunity of the swap is
taken into account through the structure functions. For example, the state vector
(0, 1, 0) represents the situation when components 1 and 3 fail during phase 1, but
component 2 is still functioning, in this case, φ1(0, 1, 0) = φ
(E)
1 (0, 1, 0) = 0, how-
ever, φ
(W )
1 (0, 1, 0) = 1, because in this scenario component 2 would be swapped by
component 1 during phase 1. The state vector (0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1) represents the situ-
ation when component 1 fails during phase 1, but components 2 and 3 continue
to function until the end of phase 2. In this case φ1,2(0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1) = 0, how-
ever, φ
(W )
1,2 (0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1) = φ
(E)
1,2 (0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1) = 1, because component 1 would be
swapped by component 2 at the time of transition to phase 2 in order to continue
the mission of phase 2.
Table 4.10 shows the results of the survival signatures for the original PMS
and for both scenarios. The first group of results are the survival signatures of
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phase 1, where Φ1, Φ
(W )
1 , Φ
(E)
1 are the survival signatures for the original PMS and
for both scenarios, respectively. The second group of results contain the survival
signatures of the first two phases, where Φ1,2, Φ
(W )
1,2 , Φ
(E)
1,2 are the survival signatures
for the original PMS and for both scenarios, respectively. The last group of results
represents the survival signatures of the whole PMS, where ΦS, Φ
(W )
S , Φ
(E)
S are the
survival signatures for the original PMS and for both scenarios, respectively. Entries
for which the survival signatures are 0 are omitted. From the results, we can see
clearly that the survival signature of the PMS is significantly improved in the case
that the swap can be performed at any time during the mission. The survival
signature in the case when the swap can be performed only at the transitions is
improved to some extent, but this improvement is not so large as in the case that
we can swap the components at any time.
Moreover, an interesting and unusual phenomenon of the value of the survival
signature is observed in the case that the swap is only applicable at the transi-
tions. In this case, the survival signature is not monotonically increasing with the
increase of the number of components that function, for example, Φ
(E)
1,2 (2, 2) = 1 >
Φ
(E)
1,2 (3, 2) = 2/3. That has not happened in the system without the operation of
component swapping. We want to briefly discuss the reason for that here. l1 = 2,
l2 = 2, indicates that one component failed during phase 1 and if this component is
component 1, then we can swap it by component 2 at transitions to complete the
mission of phase 2, however, l1 = 3, l2 = 2 indicates that there is one component
failed during phase 2 and if this component is component 1, the system would fail
in phase 2 since in this scenario the swap is not applicable.
We can obtain the conditional CDF of the components by using the failure rate of
the component in each phase in Equation (4.3.6). Then the reliability of the original
PMS can be obtained by substituting the survival signatures and the conditional
CDF into Equation (4.3.5). The results are shown in the second row of Table 4.2
and the solid line in Figure 4.2. As shown in Table 4.2 and Figure 4.2, there are
reliability jumps at t = 10 and t = 20. The reason is that if component 1 has
failed in phase 1, the PMS may still function in phase 1, however, the PMS will
fail immediately when it steps into phase 2. Therefore, there is a reliability jump
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t 0 10− 10+ 20− 20+ 30
R 1 0.99922 0.97981 0.97880 0.95887 0.95691
R(W ) 1 0.99961 0.99884 0.99872 0.99872 0.99847
R(E) 1 0.99922 0.99884 0.99778 0.99778 0.99567
Table 4.2: Reliability of the PMS in Example 4.3.1
between phases 1 and 2. Similarly, if component 2 has failed in phase 2, the system
can still function in phase 2 when component 3 is functioning, however, the system
will fail immediately when it steps into phase 3. Therefore, there is a reliability
jump between phases 2 and 3.
The reliability of the PMS when the swap is applicable at any time during the
mission or only at transition of phases can be obtained by Equation (4.3.9) and
Equation (4.3.10), respectively. The values of the reliability in both scenarios are
given in the third and fourth rows in Table 4.2 and are presented in Figure 4.2. In
Table 4.2, τ+i−1 represents the first moment in phase i, and τ
−
i represents the last
moment in phase i. In Figure 4.2, Ri, R
(W )
i and R
(E)
i , i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, are the reliability
of the original PMS and the reliability of both scenarios in phase i, respectively. The
results show that the reliability jumps at t = 10 and t = 20 are greatly reduced (or
even eliminated). The reason is that if component 1 has failed in phase 2, we can
replace it with component 2 if it still functions. Similarly, if component 2 has failed
in phase 3, it can be swapped by component 1 if it still functions. These measures
can greatly improve the reliability of the system. Moreover, these results illustrate
that the reliability of the PMS with the possibility of component swapping at any
time is higher than if can only swap components at the transitions of phases.
4.3.2 PMS with multiple types of components
Most practical PMSs for which the reliability is investigated consist of multiple types
of components. Therefore, a more interesting challenge is to develop the theory of
survival signature to such kind of PMSs.
Consider a system with N > 2 phases, and there are K types of components in
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Figure 4.2: Reliability of the PMS in Example 4.3.1
each phase. Let phase i run from time τi−1 to time τi with τ0 = 0 and τi−1 < τi, ∀i.
Let ΦS (l1,1, ..., l1,K , ..., lN,1, ..., lN,K) denote the probability that the PMS functions
given that precisely li,k, i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N} and k ∈ {1, 2, ..., K}, components of type
k function at the end of phase i. Because the failure times of the components in
the same phase are considered to be exchangeable, the survival signature of the first
N(t) phases is
ΦS
(
l1,1, ..., l1,K , ..., lN(t),1, ..., lN(t),K
)
=
N(t)∏
i=1
K∏
k=1
(
mi,k
li,k
)−1×∑
X∈S
φs (X) (4.3.11)
where N(t) ≤ N is the phase that the system is in at time t and S denotes the set
of all possible state vectors for which there are precisely li,k components of type k
functioning at the end of phase i. The number of components of type k that function
at the beginning of phase i is mi,k. As pointed out in Section 4.3.1, because both
the system and its components are non-repairable during the mission, the number of
components of type k that function at the beginning of phase i is equal to the number
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of components of type k that function at the end of phase i − 1. So, mi,k = li−1,k
while m1,k = nk, is the number of components of type k in the system.
A PMS functions if and only if all its phases are completed without failure,
therefore the reliability of the PMS can be expressed as:
R(t) =
m1,1∑
l1,1=0
...
mN(t),K∑
lN(t),K=0
ΦS (l1,1, ...l1,K , ...lN(t),1, ...lN(t),K)× P
N(t)⋂
i=1
K⋂
k=1
{Ci,k(t) = li,k}

(4.3.12)
where Ci,k(t) is the number of components of type k that function in phase i at time
t ∈ [τi−1, τi) and K is the number of types of components.
As we mentioned in Section 4.3.1, in this chapter we consider only the PMSs
with the same components in each phase, which means that all components appear
in all phases. If the components of type k in phase i have common CDF Fk(t), its
conditional CDF in phase i is Fi,k(t) at time t ∈ [τi−1, τi) conditioned on that the
system is working at the beginning of phase i, and it is equal to
Fi,k(t) =
Fk(min {t, τi})− Fk(τi−1)
1− Fk(τi−1) (4.3.13)
Equation (4.3.12) can be simplified as
R(t) =
m1,1∑
l1,1=0
...
mN(t),K∑
lN(t),K=0
[
ΦS
(
l1,1, ...l1,K , ...lN(t),1, ...lN(t),K
)×
N(t)∏
i=1
K∏
k=1
((
mi,k
li,k
)
[1− Fi,k(t)]li,k [Fi,k(t)]mi,k−li,k
)]
(4.3.14)
As in Section 4.3.1, if it is assumed that there are fixed swapping rules and that
such a swap of a component takes neglectable time, then we can study the effect
of the defined swaps if they are applicable at any time during the mission or only
at transitions of phases through the PMS survival signatures. The PMS survival
signatures if the defined swaps are applicable at any time during the mission or only
at transitions of phases are given, respectively, by
Φ
(W )
S (l1,1, ..., l1,K , ..., lN,1, ..., lN,K) =
(
N∏
i=1
K∏
k=1
(
mi,k
li,k
)−1)
×
∑
X∈S
φ(W )s (X) (4.3.15)
Φ
(E)
S (l1,1, ..., l1,K , ..., lN,1, ..., lN,K) =
(
N∏
i=1
K∏
k=1
(
mi,k
li,k
)−1)
×
∑
X∈S
φ(E)s (X) (4.3.16)
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Figure 4.3: A PMS with multiple types of components
Type Component Distribution Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
1 1,2 Weibull α = 180, β = 2.2 α = 400, β = 3.2 α = 200, β = 2.4
2 3,4,5 Exponential λ = 1× 10−3 λ = 1× 10−4 λ = 2× 10−4
Table 4.3: The distribution information of the components in Figure 4.3
where φ
(W )
s (X) and φ
(E)
s (X) are the structure functions of the PMS considering the
the defined swaps at any time during the mission or only at transition of phases,
respectively, so φ
(W )
s ≥ φ(E)s ≥ φs. The reliability of PMS in both scenarios can be
calculated straightforward by substituting the survival signature of the original PMS
in Equation (4.3.14) by the survival signatures in Equation (4.3.15) and Equation
(4.3.16) that consider these scenarios. This approach is illustrated and explained in
more detail in the next example.
Example 4.3.2 For the PMS shown in Figure 4.3, assume that phases 1, 2 and
3 last for 10, 270 and 20 hours, respectively. The components follow Weibull and
Exponential distributions and can be divided into two types according to the dis-
tribution of the lifetime. Table 4.3 summarizes the distribution information of the
components in each phase. For the Weibull distribution, F (t) = 1 − e−(t/β)α , α
and β are the scale parameter and shape parameter, respectively. For Exponential
distribution, F (t) = 1 − e−λt, λ is the failure rate. We want to examine the reli-
ability of this PMS if components 1 and 2 are swappable, and components 3 and
4 are swappable upon failure at any time during the mission or only at transition
of phases. For example, in phase 1, if the swap is applicable only at transition of
phases, then no swapping opportunity exists, but if the swap is applicable at any
time during the mission, then we can swap component 1 by 2 when component 2
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fails but component 1 still functions, and we can swap component 3 by 4 when
component 1, 4 and 5 fail but component 3 still functions. Note that if any of the
components 1 or 5 still function, component 4 cannot be swapped by component
3 because the swap is just applicable upon failure, which means that if the system
cannot continue to function with the existing components in place. The survival
signature for the original PMS is calculated by Equation (4.3.11) and the survival
signatures if the defined swaps are applicable at any time during the mission or only
at transition of phases, are calculated by Equation (4.3.15) and Equation (4.3.16),
respectively. Table 4.4 shows the survival signatures of phase 1, where Φ1, Φ
(W )
1 ,
Φ
(E)
1 are the survival signatures for the original PMS and for both scenarios, respec-
tively. Table 4.5 shows the survival signatures of the first two phases, where Φ1,2,
Φ
(W )
1,2 , Φ
(E)
1,2 are the survival signatures for the original PMS and for both scenarios,
respectively. Table 4.6 shows the survival signatures of the whole PMS, where ΦS,
Φ
(W )
S , Φ
(E)
S are the survival signatures for the original PMS and for both scenarios,
respectively. Entries for which the survival signatures are 0 are omitted.
The reliability of the PMS is shown in Table 4.7 and Figure 4.4. In Figure 4.4,
Ri, R
(W )
i and R
(E)
i , i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, are the reliability of the PMS in phase i. Specially,
R
(W )
i is for the case that we can swap the components at any time and R
(E)
i is for
the case that the components can only be swapped at the switches of phases. The
results show that there is a reliability jump at the transition of phases 2 and 3 in
the original PMS. The reason is that if components 1 and 3 or components 2, 4 and
5 have all failed simultaneously in phase 2, then the PMS still has to be functioning,
however, the PMS will fail immediately when it steps into phase 3. Therefore, there
is a reliability jump between phases 2 and 3. The operation of component swap upon
failure nearly eliminates the reliability jump between these phases. The reason for
this is that, if components 1 and 3 both failed in phase 2, then component 1 can be
swapped by 2 and component 3 can be swapped by 4. Also, if the components 2, 4
and 5 all failed in phase 2, then components 2 and 4 can be swapped by 1 and 3,
respectively. The results show that the reliability of PMS is significantly improved
as a result of possible swapping components upon failure.
4.3. Swapping components upon failure 83
The first phase
0 ≤ t ≤ 10−
l1,1 l1,2 Φ1 Φ
(W )
1 Φ
(E)
1
1 1 1/3 1 1/3
1 2 1/2 1 1/2
1 3 1/2 1 1/2
2 1 1 1 1
2 2 1 1 1
2 3 1 1 1
Table 4.4: Φ1, Φ
(W )
1 and Φ
(E)
1 of PMS shown in Example 4.3.2
The first two phases
10+ ≤ t ≤ 280−
l1,1 l1,2 l2,1 l2,2 Φ1,2 Φ
(W )
1,2 Φ
(E)
1,2 l1,1 l1,2 l2,1 l2,2 Φ1,2 Φ
(W )
1,2 Φ
(E)
1,2
1 1 0 1 0 2/3 1/6 2 2 0 2 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 0 2/3 1/6 2 2 1 1 1/3 2/3 1/2
1 2 0 1 1/6 2/3 1/4 2 2 1 2 1 1 1
1 2 0 2 1/2 1 1/2 2 2 2 0 1 1 1
1 2 1 1 1/6 2/3 1/4 2 2 2 1 1 1 1
1 2 1 2 1/2 1 1/2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1
1 3 0 1 1/6 2/3 1/6 2 3 0 1 1/3 2/3 1/3
1 3 0 2 1/2 1 1/2 2 3 0 2 1 1 1
1 3 0 3 1/2 1 1/2 2 3 0 3 1 1 1
1 3 1 1 1/6 2/3 1/6 2 3 1 1 1/3 2/3 1/3
1 3 1 2 1/2 1 1/2 2 3 1 2 1 1 1
1 3 1 3 1/2 1 1/2 2 3 1 3 1 1 1
2 1 0 1 1/3 2/3 2/3 2 3 2 0 1 1 1
2 1 1 1 1/3 2/3 2/3 2 3 2 1 1 1 1
2 1 2 0 1 1 1 2 3 2 2 1 1 1
2 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 3 2 3 1 1 1
2 2 0 1 1/3 2/3 1/2
Table 4.5: Φ1,2, Φ
(W )
1,2 and Φ
(E)
1,2 of PMS shown in Example 4.3.2
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The PMS
280+ ≤ t ≤ 300
l1,1 l1,2 l2,1 l2,2 l3,1 l3,3 ΦS Φ
(W )
S Φ
(E)
S l1,1 l1,2 l2,1 l2,2 l3,1 l3,3 ΦS Φ
(W )
S Φ
(E)
S
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2/3 1/6 2 2 2 2 2 0 1 1 1
1 2 0 2 0 2 1/3 1 1/2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1
1 2 1 1 1 1 1/6 2/3 1/6 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1
1 2 1 2 0 2 1/3 1 1/2 2 3 0 2 0 2 2/3 1 1
1 2 1 2 1 1 1/6 1 1/3 2 3 0 3 0 2 2/3 1 2/3
1 2 1 2 1 2 1/3 1 1/2 2 3 0 3 0 3 1 1 1
1 3 0 2 0 2 1/3 1 1/2 2 3 1 1 1 1 1/6 2/3 1/3
1 3 0 3 0 2 1/3 1 1/3 2 3 1 2 0 2 2/3 1 2/3
1 3 0 3 0 3 1/2 1 1/2 2 3 1 2 1 1 1/2 1 2/3
1 3 1 1 1 1 1/6 2/3 1/6 2 3 1 2 1 2 5/6 1 1
1 3 1 2 0 2 1/3 1 1/2 2 3 1 3 0 2 2/3 1 2/3
1 3 1 2 1 1 1/6 1 1/3 2 3 1 3 0 3 1 1 1
1 3 1 2 1 2 1/3 1 1/2 2 3 1 3 1 1 1/2 1 1/2
1 3 1 3 0 2 1/3 1 1/3 2 3 1 3 1 2 5/6 1 5/6
1 3 1 3 0 3 1/2 1 1/2 2 3 1 3 1 3 1 1 1
1 3 1 3 1 1 1/6 1 1/6 2 3 2 0 2 0 1 1 1
1 3 1 3 1 2 1/3 1 1/2 2 3 2 1 1 1 1/2 1 1/2
1 3 1 3 1 3 1/2 1 1/2 2 3 2 1 2 0 1 1 1
2 1 1 1 1 1 1/6 2/3 1/3 2 3 2 1 2 1 1 1 1
2 1 2 0 2 0 1 1 1 2 3 2 2 0 2 2/3 1 2/3
2 1 2 1 1 1 1/2 1 1/2 2 3 2 2 1 1 1/2 1 1/2
2 1 2 1 2 0 1 1 1 2 3 2 2 1 2 5/6 1 5/6
2 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 3 2 2 2 0 1 1 1
2 2 0 2 0 2 2/3 1 1 2 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 1
2 2 1 1 1 1 1/6 2/3 1/3 2 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1
2 2 1 2 0 2 2/3 1 2/3 2 3 2 3 0 2 2/3 1 2/3
2 2 1 2 1 1 1/2 1 2/3 2 3 2 3 0 3 1 1 1
2 2 1 2 1 2 5/6 1 1 2 3 2 3 1 1 1/2 1 1/2
2 2 2 0 2 0 1 1 1 2 3 2 3 1 2 5/6 1 5/6
2 2 2 1 1 1 1/2 1 1/2 2 3 2 3 1 3 1 1 1
2 2 2 1 2 0 1 1 1 2 3 2 3 2 0 1 1 1
2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 3 2 3 2 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 0 2 2/3 1 2/3 2 3 2 3 2 2 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 1 1 1/2 1 1/2 2 3 2 3 2 3 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 1 2 5/6 1 5/6
Table 4.6: ΦS, Φ
(W )
S and Φ
(E)
S of PMS shown in Example 4.3.2
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Figure 4.4: Reliability of the PMS in Example 4.3.2
t 0 10− 10+ 280− 280+ 300
R 1 0.998269 0.998269 0.997046 0.987450 0.976445
R(W ) 1 0.999996 0.999996 0.999371 0.999179 0.998375
R(E) 1 0.998269 0.998269 0.997211 0.996951 0.983626
Table 4.7: Reliability of the PMS in Example 4.3.2
4.4 Swapping components according to structure
importance
In Section 4.3, the reliability of the PMS is improved by swapping components upon
failure. In this section, we consider an another swapping strategy to improve the
reliability of PMSs, which is having swapping of components according to structure
importance. In this strategy, the structure importance is used to measure the im-
portance level of the components in contributing to system reliability, then when
a component with high importance fails, it is swapped by another component with
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lower importance from the system which has not yet failed. If the component is
swapped according to the structure importance criterion, the swap will take place
with disregard of whether or not the system can continue to function with the exist-
ing components in place, depending on the level of the importance of the component
that has failed. However, if the component is swapped upon failure, the swap takes
place only if the PMS cannot continue to function with the existing components in
place.
As introduced in Chapter 1, since it is assumed that only components of the
same type are swappable, the structural importance which measures the relative
importance of components with respect to their positions is sufficient to prioritize
the components in each phase [11]. The structural importance of component j ∈
{1, 2, · · · , n} for the configuration in phase i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N} denoted by SI(i)j , is
defined as
SI
(i)
j =
1
2n−1
∑
xj
[
φi(1j, x
j)− φi(0j, xj)
]
(4.4.1)
where φi(·) is the structure function of the system in phase i; xj represents the
component state vector with xj removed, (1j, x
j) and (0j, x
j) represent the compo-
nent vector when component j in phase i is in state 1 or 0, respectively and 2n−1
represents the total number of different state vector with n− 1 in it.
After the components are prioritized by structural importance, the swapping
rules are defined upon this prioritization, so it is assumed that when a component
with high importance fails, it is swapped by another component of the same type
with lower importance which has not yet failed. It is assumed further that the swap
between components takes neglectable time and does not affect the functioning
state of the component that changes its role in the PMS nor its remaining time until
failure.
We can calculate the reliability of a PMS after we define the swapping rules
according to the structural importance, in the same way as in Section 4.3. We take
the effect of the defined swaps either if they are applicable at any time during the
mission or only at transitions of phases, into account through the PMS structure
function, and hence, it can be taken into account for computation of the system re-
liability through the PMS survival signature. The survival signatures, if the defined
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Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
SI
(1)
1 SI
(1)
2 SI
(1)
3 SI
(2)
1 SI
(2)
2 SI
(2)
3 SI
(3)
1 SI
(3)
2 SI
(3)
3
0.75 0.25 0.25 0.75 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.75 0.25
Table 4.8: Structure importance for the configuration in Figure 4.1
swaps according to the structure importance are applicable at any time during the
mission or only at transitions of phases, can be calculated using Equation (4.3.15)
and Equation (4.3.16) respectively and the reliability can be obtained as in Section
4.3 by substituting the survival signature of the original PMS in Equation (4.3.14)
by these survival signatures. This approach is illustrated and explained in more
detail in the following two examples.
Example 4.4.1 Consider again the system in Figure 4.1 and the same scenario for
the phases duration and the conditional lifetime distribution of the components in
each phase as in Example 4.3.1. We want to examine the reliability of this PMS if
the components are swapped according to structural importance. Table 4.10 listed
structural importance of each component for the configuration in each phase of the
PMS shown in Figure 4.1.
The results show that, for the first two phases, the structural importance of
component 2 is equal to that of component 3, and both are lower than the structural
importance of component 1 so SI
(1)
1 > SI
(1)
2 = SI
(1)
3 , SI
(2)
1 > SI
(2)
2 = SI
(2)
3 . In
phase 3, the structural importance of component 1 is equal to that of component
3, and the importance of components 1 and 3 is lower than that of component 2 so
SI
(3)
2 > SI
(3)
1 = SI
(3)
3 . Therefore, we would enable to swap component 2 or 3 into
the place of component 1, if that fails in the first two phases. In phase 3, it is better
to swap component 1 or 3 into the place of component 2 if that component fails.
Let us assume that components 1 and 2 are swappable according to their struc-
tural importance. Therefore, if components 1 and 2 are swappable at any time
during the mission, we can swap component 2 by 1 in phases 1 and 2 if component
1 fails but component 2 is still functioning. Similarly, component 1 can take over
the role of component 2 in phase 3, if component 2 fails but component 1 is still
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functioning. If components 1 and 2 are swappable only at switches of phases, we
can swap component 2 by 1 at the switch of phases 1 and 2 when component 1 fails
but component 2 is still functioning. Similarly, component 2 can take over the role
of component 1 at the switch of phases 2 and 3, if component 2 fails but component
1 is still functioning. Therefore, the cases of the swap that we have if components 1
and 2 are swappable according to its structural importance in this example are the
same as the cases of the swap that we have in Example 4.3.1 when components 1
and 2 are swappable upon failure, but this is not usually the case as we will see in
the next example. So, the results of the survival signatures are the same as in Table
4.10 and the results of the reliability are the same as that are shown in Table 4.2
and Figure 4.2.
Example 4.4.2 Consider the system in Figure 4.3 and we keep the same scenario
for the phases duration and the conditional lifetime distribution of the components
in each phase as in Example 4.3.2. Structural importance analysis is conducted
to measure the importance of the components in contributing to system reliability
in each phase, the results are shown in Table 4.9. The results show the orders
of structure importances are SI
(1)
2 > SI
(1)
1 , SI
(1)
4 = SI
(1)
5 > SI
(1)
3 , SI
(2)
1 = SI
(2)
2 ,
SI
(2)
3 > SI
(2)
4 = SI
(2)
5 , SI
(3)
1 > SI
(3)
2 , SI
(3)
3 > SI
(3)
4 = SI
(3)
5 . Therefore, for the
components of type 1, if components 1 and 2 are swappable, we can swap component
1 by 2 in phases 1 when component 2 fails but component 1 still functions. And
we can swap component 2 by 1 in phase 3. Similarly, for the components of type
2, if components 3 and 4 are swappable, we can swap component 3 by 4 in phase
1 when component 4 fails but component 2 still functions. Moreover, component 4
can take over the role of component 3 in phases 2 and 3 when component 3 fails
but component 4 still functions. Table 4.10, Table 4.11 and Table 4.12 show The
resulting survival signatures of phase 1, the survival signatures of the first two phases
and the survival signatures of the whole PMS, respectively. Entries for which the
survival signatures are 0 are omitted. The resulting reliability function are shown
in Figure 4.5 with the specific values around transition times given in Table 4.13.
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Phase 1
SI
(1)
1 SI
(1)
2 SI
(1)
3 SI
(1)
4 SI
(1)
5
0.06 0.81 0.06 0.19 0.19
Phase 2
SI
(2)
1 SI
(2)
2 SI
(2)
3 SI
(2)
4 SI
(2)
5
0.19 0.19 0.56 0.19 0.19
Phase 3
SI
(3)
1 SI
(3)
2 SI
(3)
3 SI
(3)
4 SI
(3)
5
0.44 0.19 0.44 0.19 0.19
Table 4.9: Structure importance for the configuration in each phase in Figure 4.3
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The first phase
0 ≤ t ≤ 10−
l1,1 l1,2 Φ1 Φ
(W )
1 Φ
(E)
1
1 1 1/3 1 1/3
1 2 1/2 1 1/2
1 3 1/2 1 1/2
2 1 1 1 1
2 2 1 1 1
2 3 1 1 1
Table 4.10: Φ1, Φ
(W )
1 and Φ
(E)
1 of PMS shown in Example 4.4.2
The first two phases
10+ ≤ t ≤ 280−
l1,1 l1,2 l2,1 l2,2 Φ1,2 Φ
(W )
1,2 Φ
(E)
1,2 l1,1 l1,2 l2,1 l2,2 Φ1,2 Φ
(W )
1,2 Φ
(E)
1,2
1 1 0 1 0 2/3 1/6 2 2 0 2 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 0 2/3 1/6 2 2 1 1 1/3 2/3 1/2
1 2 0 1 1/6 2/3 1/4 2 2 1 2 1 1 1
1 2 0 2 1/2 1 1/2 2 2 2 0 1 1 1
1 2 1 1 1/6 2/3 1/4 2 2 2 1 1 1 1
1 2 1 2 1/2 1 1/2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1
1 3 0 1 1/6 2/3 1/6 2 3 0 1 1/3 2/3 1/3
1 3 0 2 1/2 1 1/2 2 3 0 2 1 1 1
1 3 0 3 1/2 1 1/2 2 3 0 3 1 1 1
1 3 1 1 1/6 2/3 1/6 2 3 1 1 1/3 2/3 1/3
1 3 1 2 1/2 1 1/2 2 3 1 2 1 1 1
1 3 1 3 1/2 1 1/2 2 3 1 3 1 1 1
2 1 0 1 1/3 2/3 2/3 2 3 2 0 1 1 1
2 1 1 1 1/3 2/3 2/3 2 3 2 1 1 1 1
2 1 2 0 1 1 1 2 3 2 2 1 1 1
2 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 3 2 3 1 1 1
2 2 0 1 1/3 2/3 1/2
Table 4.11: Φ1,2, Φ
(W )
1,2 and Φ
(E)
1,2 of PMS shown in Example 4.4.2
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The PMS
280+ ≤ t ≤ 300
l1,1 l1,2 l2,1 l2,2 l3,1 l3,3 ΦS Φ
(W )
S Φ
(E)
S l1,1 l1,2 l2,1 l2,2 l3,1 l3,3 ΦS Φ
(W )
S Φ
(E)
S
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 0 1 1 1
1 2 0 2 0 2 1/3 1 1/2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1
1 2 1 1 1 1 1/6 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1
1 2 1 2 0 2 1/3 1 1/2 2 3 0 2 0 2 2/3 1 1
1 2 1 2 1 1 1/6 1/3 1/4 2 3 0 3 0 2 2/3 1 2/3
1 2 1 2 1 2 1/3 1 1/2 2 3 0 3 0 3 1 1 1
1 3 0 2 0 2 1/3 1 1/2 2 3 1 1 1 1 1/6 0 0
1 3 0 3 0 2 1/3 1 1/3 2 3 1 2 0 2 2/3 1 1
1 3 0 3 0 3 1/2 1 1/2 2 3 1 2 1 1 1/2 1/3 1/2
1 3 1 1 1 1 1/6 0 0 2 3 1 2 1 2 5/6 1 1
1 3 1 2 0 2 1/3 1 1/2 2 3 1 3 0 2 2/3 1 2/3
1 3 1 2 1 1 1/6 1/3 1/4 2 3 1 3 0 3 1 1 1
1 3 1 2 1 2 1/3 1 1/2 2 3 1 3 1 1 1/2 1/3 2/3
1 3 1 3 0 2 1/3 1 1/3 2 3 1 3 1 2 5/6 1 1
1 3 1 3 0 3 1/2 1 1/2 2 3 1 3 1 3 1 1 1
1 3 1 3 1 1 1/6 1/3 1/3 2 3 2 0 2 0 1 1 1
1 3 1 3 1 2 1/3 1 1/2 2 3 2 1 1 1 1/2 1/3 1/2
1 3 1 3 1 3 1/2 1 1/2 2 3 2 1 2 0 1 1 1
2 1 1 1 1 1 1/6 0 0 2 3 2 1 2 1 1 1 1
2 1 2 0 2 0 1 1 1 2 3 2 2 0 2 2/3 1 1
2 1 2 1 1 1 1/2 1/6 1/2 2 3 2 2 1 1 1/2 2/3 1/2
2 1 2 1 2 0 1 1 1 2 3 2 2 1 2 5/6 1 1
2 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 3 2 2 2 0 1 1 1
2 2 0 2 0 2 2/3 1 1 2 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 1
2 2 1 1 1 1 1/6 0 0 2 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1
2 2 1 2 0 2 2/3 1 1 2 3 2 3 0 2 2/3 1 2/3
2 2 1 2 1 1 1/2 1/3 1/2 2 3 2 3 0 3 1 1 1
2 2 1 2 1 2 5/6 1 1 2 3 2 3 1 1 1/2 1/2 1/3
2 2 2 0 2 0 1 1 1 2 3 2 3 1 2 5/6 5/6 1
2 2 2 1 1 1 1/2 1/3 1/2 2 3 2 3 1 3 1 1 1
2 2 2 1 2 0 1 1 1 2 3 2 3 2 0 1 1 1
2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 3 2 3 2 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 0 2 2/3 1 1 2 3 2 3 2 2 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 1 1 1/2 1/3 1/2 2 3 2 3 2 3 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 1 2 5/6 1 1
Table 4.12: ΦS, Φ
(W )
S and Φ
(E)
S of PMS shown in Example 4.4.2
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Figure 4.5: Reliability of the PMS in Example 4.4.2
t 0 10− 10+ 280− 280+ 300
RS 1 0.998269 0.998269 0.997046 0.987450 0.976445
R
(w)
S 1 0.999996 0.999996 0.999371 0.998166 0.996450
R
(E)
S 1 0.998269 0.998269 0.997211 0.996446 0.994388
Table 4.13: Reliability of the PMS in Example 4.4.2
Comparing these results with the results in Example 4.3.2 in which the com-
ponents are swapped upon failure, we find that the survival signatures and the
reliability in phases 1 and 2, if the components 1 and 2 are swappable, and the com-
ponents 3 and 4 are swappable according to their structural importances are exactly
the same as if these components are swapped upon failure, however, in phase 3,
the results are different. The reason is that there is some cases of the swaps that
happen when the components are swapped upon failure but not happen when the
components swapped according to their structural importance, and vice versa. For
example, if the swaps are applicable at any time during the mission, when the com-
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ponents 1 and 4 function and components 2, 3 and 5 are failed in phase 3, the PMS
continue to function when the components are swapped upon failure, since there is
no need for component swapping in this case, however, when the components are
swapped according to their structural importances, the system will have failed since
in this case component 4 has taken over the role of component 3, because component
4 is classified as less importance than 3.
The results also show that the reliability jump at the transition of phases 2 and
3 in the original PMS is reduced when the components are swapped according to
its structural importance. However, the amount of reduction that is gained if the
component are swapped upon failure, is more than if they are swapped according
to their structural importance. The reason for this is that in the case when the
components are swapped according to their structure importances, if the components
2, 4 and 5 all failed during phase 2, then components 2 and 4 cannot be swapped by
1 and 3 respectively when is needed, as in the case when the components swapped
upon failure.
4.5 Cost analysis of PMS with component swap-
ping
In Chapter 3, we have analyzed the cost effectiveness of component swapping over a
fixed period of time. In this section, we aim to extend the cost effectiveness analysis
of component swapping to phased mission system under the assumption that each
phase of the system would need to complete its mission successfully, where failure
to achieve this incurs a penalty cost allocated to each phase of not performing its
mission. We consider time independent penalty costs in Section 4.5.1 and time
dependent penalty cost in Section 4.5.2. In each section the expected costs when
the components swapping (either upon failure or according to reliability importance)
is applicable at any time during the mission, are compared with the option when it
is applicable only at transitions, and also with the option not to enable swaps.
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4.5.1 Time independent penalty costs
Suppose that we have a PMS which needs to perform a sequence of missions in a
certain period of time [τ0, τN). The system must function during all the phases. If
the system fails at any time during phase i before N , then a fixed penalty cost must
be paid. Let this cost be
P (i) =
N∑
j=i
pj (4.5.1)
where pj, j = i, · · · , N , is a specific cost resulting for phase j not being completed.
We assume that pj is independent of the failure time during phase j. Let Ts denote
the random failure time of the PMS. We need to derive the probability that the
system fails during phase i, so P (Ts ∈ [τi−1, τi)). Let Ai denote the event that the
PMS fails at any time during phase i, i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}, so Aci denotes the event that
the PMS survives during phase i.
P (Ts ∈ [τi−1, τi)) =P (Ac1, Ac2, · · · , Aci−1, Ai) =
P (Ac1, A
c
2, · · · , Aci−1)− P (Ac1, Ac2, · · · , Aci−1, Aci)
Let R(τ−i−1) = P (A
c
1, A
c
2, · · · , Aci−1) be the probability that the system survives
phase i− 1, and R(τ−i ) = P (Ac1, Ac2, · · · , Aci−1, Aci) is the probability that the system
survives phase i, then, the probability that the system fail during phase i is
P (Ts ∈ [τi−1, τi)) = R(τ−i−1)−R(τ−i )
Let CS denote the expected cost of failure of the PMS,
CS =
N∑
i=1
P (i)
(
R(τ−i−1)−R(τ−i )
)
(4.5.2)
where τ−i represents the last moment in phase i.
As described in Sections 4.3 and 4.4, the reliability of PMSs can be improved by
swapping components either at any time during the mission or only at the transition
of phases. An upfront cost may need to be paid to enable each swapping scenario.
Let b denote the cost to enable a regime of specified swaps at any time during the
mission and e denote the cost to enable a regime of specified swaps only at the
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transition of phases. Let C
(W )
S and C
(W )
S denote the expected costs of the system in
both scenarios, respectively. These expected costs are derived as follows:
C
(W )
S = b+
N∑
i=1
[
P (i)
(
R(W )(τ−i−1)−R(W )(τ−i )
)]
(4.5.3)
C
(E)
S = e+
N∑
i=1
[
P (i)
(
R(E)(τ−i−1)−R(E)(τ−i )
)]
(4.5.4)
where R(W )(t) is the reliability of the system at time t ∈ [τi−1, τi) if the specified
swaps are applicable at any time during the mission, and R(E)(t) is the reliability of
the system the specified swaps are applicable only at the transitions of phases.
4.5.2 Time dependent penalty costs
In practical engineering, the cost penalty for failure of a PMS may be time depen-
dent. Similar as in Section 3.2.2, we consider the case where the costs are based on
the system downtime, let the penalty cost per unit of time in phase i be ui. If the
system fails at time TS ∈ [τi−1, τi), then the down time is (τi−TS)+
∑N
k=i+1(τk−τk−1)
for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}, k ∈ {2, 3, · · · , N − 1}. If the system fails during phase i, the
expected penalty costs that need to be paid are
CSi =
∫ τ−i
τ+i−1
f(t)
(
ui(τi − t) +
N∑
k=i+1
uk(τk − τk−1)
)
dt.
where τ+i−1 represents the first moment in phase i and τ
−
i represents the last moment
in phase i and f(t) is the PDF of the failure time of the PMS. If the system fails at
τi, the expected penalty cost are
CSτi = P (TS = τi)
( N∑
k=i+1
uk(τk − τk−1)
)
Let CS denote the expected cost of a PMS, then
CS =
N∑
i=1
[∫ τ−i
τ+i−1
f(t)
(
ui(τi − t) +
N∑
k=i+1
uk(τk − τk−1)
)
dt+
P (TS = τi)
( N∑
k=i+1
uk(τk − τk−1)
)]
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=
N∑
i=1
[
ui
∫ τ−i
τ+i−1
(τi − t)f(t)dt+
(
F (τ−i )− F (τ+i−1)
) N∑
k=i+1
uk(τk − τk−1)+
(
F (τ+i )− F (τ−i )
)( N∑
k=i+1
uk(τk − τk−1)
)]
=
N∑
i=1
[
ui
∫ τ−i
τ+i−1
(τi − t)f(t)dt+
(
R(τ+i−1)−R(τ+i )
) N∑
k=i+1
uk(τk − τk−1)
]
(4.5.5)
We derive
∫ τ−i
τ+i−1
(τi − t)f(t)dt as follows,∫ τ−i
τ+i−1
(τi − t)f(t)dt = τi[F (τ−i )− F (τ+i−1)]−
∫ τ−i
τ+i−1
tf(t)dt (4.5.6)
and ∫ τ−i
τ+i−1
tf(t)dt =
∫ τ−i
0
tf(t)dt−
∫ τ+i−1
0
tf(t)dt (4.5.7)
We derive
∫ τ−i
0
tf(t)dt for any i = 1, 2, · · · , N as follows,∫ τ−i
0
tf(t)dt =
∫ τ−i
0
∫ t
0
f(t)dudt =
∫ τ−i
0
∫ τ−i
u
f(t)dtdu =
∫ τ−i
0
F (τ−i )− F (u)du =∫ τ−i
0
(F (τ−i )− 1) + (1− F (u))du = −τiR(τ−i ) +
∫ τ−i
0
R(u)du (4.5.8)
Substituting the result from Equation (4.5.8) to Equation (4.5.7), gives∫ τ−i
τ+i−1
tf(t)dt = −τiR(τ−i ) +
∫ τ−i
0
R(u)du−
[
−τi−1R(τ+i−1) +
∫ τ+i−1
0
R(u)du
]
(4.5.9)
Substituting the result from Equation (4.5.9) to Equation (4.5.6), gives∫ τ−i
τ+i−1
(τi − t)f(t)dt = (τi − τi−1)R(τ+i−1)−
∫ τ−i
τ+i−1
R(t)dt (4.5.10)
From Equations(4.5.9) and (4.5.5), the expected cost of failure of a PMS is given
by the following equation:
CS =
N∑
i=1
[
ui
(
(τi − τi−1)R(τ+i−1)−
∫ τ−i
τ+i−1
R(t)dt
)
+
(
R(τ+i−1)−R(τ+i )
) N∑
k=i+1
uk(τk − τk−1)
]
(4.5.11)
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Similarly, as shown above with time independent penalty costs, if b is the upfront
cost needed to be paid to enable a regime of specified swaps at any time during the
mission, and e is the upfront cost needed to be paid to enable a regime of specified
swaps at only at the transitions of phases, the expected costs in both scenarios are
given by the following equations
C
(W )
S =b+
N∑
i=1
[
ui
(
(τi − τi−1)R(W )(τ+i−1)−
∫ τ−i
τ+i−1
R(W )(t)dt
)
+
(
R(W )(τ+i−1)−R(W )(τ+i )
) N∑
k=i+1
uk(τk − τk−1)
]
(4.5.12)
C
(E)
S =e+
N∑
i=1
[
ui
(
(τi − τi−1)R(E)(τ+i−1)−
∫ τ−i
τ+i−1
R(E)(t)dt
)
+
(
R(E)(τ+i−1)−R(E)(τ+i )
) N∑
k=i+1
uk(τk − τk−1)
]
(4.5.13)
The following two examples illustrate the effect of swapping components in both
scenarios on the expected costs for a PMS when the components are swapped upon
failure, while the case when the components are swapped according to structure
importance will be illustrated in Example 4.5.3.
Example 4.5.1 In this example, we consider again the PMS with single type of
components as in Figure 4.1 and we keep the same scenario for the duration of all
the three phases and for the conditional lifetime distribution of the components in
each phase as in Example 4.3.1. We also consider the same scenario for the swapping
opportunity as in Example 4.3.1, namely components 1 and 2 can be swapped upon
failure. We want to compare the expected cost of the original PMS with the expected
cost when components 1 and 2 are swappable at any time during the mission or only
at switches of phases.
Assume that the penalty costs allocated to each phase of not performing its
mission are 1× 103, 8× 102 and 5× 102, respectively, for phase 1, 2, and 3. If these
penalty costs are independent of the failure time during or before the phases, the
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expected cost for the original PMS are given by Equation (4.5.2) and equal to
CS =
[
23× 102
(
1−R(10−)
)]
+
[
13× 102
(
R(10−)−R(20−)
)]
+[
5× 102
(
R(20−)−R(30)
)]
= 39.28
Assume that the cost to enable the swap at any time during the mission is
b = 50, and the cost to enable the swap only at the transitions of phases is e = 3.
The expected cost of failure in both swapping scenarios are as follows:
C
(W )
S =50 +
[
23× 102
(
1−R(W )(10−)
)]
+
[
13× 102
(
R(W )(10−)−R(W )(20−)
)]
+[
5× 102
(
R(W )(20−)−R(W )(30)
)]
= 52.1
C
(E)
S =3 +
[
23× 102
(
1−R(E)(10−)
)]
+
[
13× 102
(
R(E)(10−)−R(E)(20−)
)]
+[
5× 102
(
R(E)(20−)−R(E)(30)
)]
= 7.72
It can be clearly seen that, while taking the opportunity of both swapping scenar-
ios would reduce the expected costs, the maximum reduction is obtained when the
swap is applicable only at the switches of phases. In Figure 4.6(a), we plot the ex-
pected cost as a function of the swap costs. We can clearly see that CS ≤ C(W )S when
b ≥ 37.11 and CS ≤ C(E)S when e ≥ 34.58. Also, C(W )S = C(E)S when b = e + 2.54.
Therefore, in the case that b ≤ e + 2.54 and b < 37.11 it is better to take the
option that enable the swap at any time during the mission, and in the case that
b > e+ 2.54 and e < 34.58 it is better to take the option to enable the swap only at
the transitions of phases. In the other cases is better not to take the option of any
swap scenarios.
Now assume that the penalty cost is time dependent where 1× 103, 8× 102 and
5×102 are the costs per unit of time in phases 1, 2 and 3, respectively, and the swap
costs at any time during the mission and at the transitions of phases are b = 50 and
e = 3, respectively. The expected cost of the original PMS and the expected costs
in the both scenarios are calculated as follows:
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CS =
[
1× 103
(
10−
∫ 10−
0
R(t)dt
)
+
(
1−R(10+)
)(
(8 + 5)× 102(10)
)]
+[
8× 102
(
(10)R(10+)−
∫ 20−
10+
R(t)dt
)
+
(
R(10+)−R(20+)
)(
5× 102(10)
)]
+
[
5× 102
(
(10)R(20+)−
∫ 30
20+
R(t)dt
)]
= 378.71
C
(W )
S = 50 +
[
1× 103
(
10−
∫ 10−
0
R(W )(t)dt
)
+
(
1−R(W )(10+)
)(
(8 + 5)× 102(10)
)]
+[
8× 102
(
(10)R(W )(10+)−
∫ 20−
10+
R(t)dt
)
+
(
R(W )(10+)−R(W )(20+)
)(
5× 102(10)
)]
+
[
5× 102
(
(10)R(W )(20+)−
∫ 30
20+
R(W )(t)dt
)]
= 68.07
C
(E)
S = 3 +
[
1× 103
(
10−
∫ 10−
0
R(E)(t)dt
)
+
(
1−R(E)(10+)
)(
(8 + 5)× 102(10)
)]
+[
8× 102
(
(10)R(E)(10+)−
∫ 20−
10+
R(t)dt
)
+
(
R(E)(10+)−R(E)(20+)
)(
5× 102(10)
)]
+
[
5× 102
(
(10)R(E)(20+)−
∫ 30
20+
R(E)(t)dt
)]
= 35.49
It can be clearly seen that the best option is to take the opportunity to enable
the swap only at the switches of phases. The expected costs are plotted as a function
of the swap costs in Figure 4.6(b). We can see that CS ≤ C(W )S when b ≥ 360.65
and CS ≤ C(E)S when e ≥ 346.22. Also, C(W )S = C(E)S when b = e+ 14.42. Therefore,
if b ≤ e + 14.42 and b < 360.65 it is better to take the opportunity to enable the
swap at any time during the mission, and if b > e+ 14.42 and e < 346.22 it is better
to take the opportunity to enable the swap only at the transitions of phases. In all
other cases it is better not to take the option of any swap scenarios.
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Figure 4.6: Cost for the PMS in Example 4.3.1
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Example 4.5.2 In this example, we consider the same PMS with multiple types
of components as in Figure 4.3, and we keep the same scenario for the duration of
all the three phases and for the conditional lifetime distributions of the components
in each phase as in Example 4.3.2 and Example 4.4.2. Also, we consider the same
scenario for the swapping case as in Example 4.3.2, namely that components 1 and
2 are swappable, and components 3 and 4 are swappable, upon failure. We want to
compare the expected costs of the original PMS with the expected costs when the
components are swapped at any time during the mission or only at transitions of
phases.
Assume that the penalty costs allocated to phases 1, 2 and 3 are 1× 103, 8× 102
and 5× 102, respectively, and the swap cost at any time during the mission and at
the transitions of phases are b = 50 and e = 3. If the penalty costs are independent
of the failure time during the phases, the expected cost for the original PMS is CS =
15.87 and the expected cost in both scenarios are C
(W )
S = 51.32 and C
(E)
S = 15.15.
Therefore, the least cost is obtained when the swap is enabled only at the transitions
of phases, followed by the option of not to enable any swaps, and the maximum cost
is when the swap is enabled at any time during the mission.
We plot the expected costs as functions of the swap costs in Figure 4.7(a). From
this figure we can see that CS ≤ C(W )S when b ≥ 14.55, CS ≤ C(E)S when e ≥ 3.72 and
C
(W )
S = C
(E)
S when b = e + 10.83. Therefore, it it is better to take the opportunity
to enable the swap at any time during the mission if b ≤ e + 10.83 and b < 14.55,
it is better to take the opportunity to enable the swap only at the transitions of
phases if b > e + 10.83 and e < 3.72, and in the other cases it is better to not take
the option of any swaps.
If the penalty costs are dependent on the failure time during the phases, the
expected cost of the original PMS and the expected costs in both scenarios are
CS = 615.38, C
(W )
S = 90.63 and C
(E)
S = 526.99. Figure 4.7(b) shows the expected
cost as a function of the swap costs. CS ≤ C(W )S when b ≥ 574.75, CS ≤ C(E)S
when e ≥ 91.39, and C(W )S = C(E)S when b = e + 483.36, so, if b ≤ e + 483.36 and
b < 574.75 is good to take the opportunity that enable the swap at any time during
the mission, if b > e + 483.36 and e < 91.39 it is better to take the opportunity to
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Figure 4.7: Cost for the PMS in Example 4.4.1
enable the swap only at the transitions of phases, and in the other cases it is better
to not take the option of any swaps scenarios.
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Example 4.5.3 In this example, we consider again the same system in Figure 4.3,
and we want to analyse the cost of this system if the component swapped accord-
ing to the structure importance as Example 4.4.2, we also keep the same scenario
for the duration of all three phases and for conditional lifetime distribution of the
components in each phase as in Example 4.3.2, and Example 4.4.2. If the penalty
costs of failure and the swap costs are the same as Example 4.5.2, the expected
costs when the penalty costs are independent of the failure time during the phase
is CS = 15.87 for the original system and are C
(W )
S = 52.28 C
(E)
S = 16.77 for the
both swap scenarios. Comparing these results with the results when the components
swapped upon failure in Example 4.5.2, we find that in this example it is better to
not take the option of any swap scenarios, but in the previous example is good to
take the the opportunity to enable the swap only at the transitions of phases. This
because the improvement that is gained in the reliability when the components are
swapped upon failure is more than if they are swapped according to the structure
importance.
Figure 4.8(a) shows how the expected costs would change depending on the cost
of the swap. We can see in this figure that if b ≤ e + 4.48 and b < 13.59 is good
to take the opportunity that enable the swap at any time during the mission, if
e < 9.10 and b > e + 4.48 is good to take the opportunity to enable the swap only
at the switches of phases, and in the other cases is good to not take the option of
any swap scenarios.
If the penalty costs of failure is time dependent, the expected cost for the original
system is CS = 615.38 and for the both swap scenarios are C
(W )
S = 105.41 and
C
(E)
S = 473.02. Comparing these results with the results in Example 4.5.2, it clear
that although the best option in both results is to take the the opportunity to enable
the swap only at the transitions of phases, the expected cost when the components
are swapped upon failure is less than if they are swapped according to the structure
importance.
If we plot the expected costs against the swap cost, we can see in Figure 4.8(b)
that, if b ≤ e+ 414.60 and b < 559.96 it is better to take the opportunity to enable
the swap at any time during the mission, if e < 145.35 and b > e+414.60 it is better
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Figure 4.8: Cost for the PMS in Example 4.4.2
to take the opportunity to enable the swap only at the transitions of phases, and in
the other cases it is better to not take the option of any swap scenarios.
The analyses in the previous examples show that the operation of component
swapping either at any time during the mission or only at the transitions of phases
might contribute significantly to reducing the expected costs of the PMS. The
amount of this contribution depends on the gain in the reliability that due to these
swap scenarios and on the swap costs.
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4.6 Concluding remarks
A phased mission system (PMS) is one that performs several different tasks or
functions in sequence. In order to accomplish the mission successfully, the system
has to complete every phase without failure. Therefore, it is often difficult for
a PMS to work with high reliability. We extended the new interesting strategy
of swapping components upon failure as introduced in Chapter 2 of this thesis,
to improve the reliability of PMSs. It is assumed that when a component fails,
it can be swapped by another one which is still functioning in order to prevent
the PMS from failure. In addition, in this chapter we discussed the strategy of
swapping components according to structure importance. The structure importance
is used to measure the importance level of the components in contributing to system
reliability, then when a component with high importance fails, it is swapped by
another component with lower importance form the system which has not yet failed,
in order to improve the system reliability.
The survival signature methodology that is introduced by [37] is used to analyse
the effect of component swapping according to both strategies on the reliability of
the PMS, comparing the scenario when the swap between components is applica-
ble at any time during the mission with the scenario when it is applicable only at
transitions of phases. The analysis shows the effectiveness of component swapping
in both scenarios in improving the reliability of the system. Considering component
swapping strategy in increasing the reliability of the PMS is attractive since it will
not increase the weight and volume of the system. What is more important and need
to be emphasized is that, in the proposed approaches, the reliability and number of
components do not need to be increased to improve the system reliability. A topic
for further research could be to study the contribution that swapping components
can make to PMS resilience in comparison to other activities, including more in-
built redundancy, standby components, or maintenance and replacement activities.
Moreover, a further interesting topic is the possibility to swap PMS components
when they are all still functioning. This could be attractive if one has the opportu-
nity to swap components of different types, where for example, a critical component
may, while still functioning, be swapped with another of different type component
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at a certain time if they have different hazard rates over time, for example, a compo-
nent with increasing hazard rate may be best to use in a critical part of the system
in early stages, to then be swapped by a component with decreasing hazard rate to
improve system reliability at later stages.
In this chapter, we derive two models (time independent and time dependent)
of penalty costs of PMSs, in order to compare the expected costs for the PMS when
there is a possibility to swap components with the option not to enable swaps. This
shows that although an upfront cost might need to be paid to enable each swapping
opportunity, the operation of component swapping either at any time during the
mission or only at the switches of phases might contribute significantly in reducing
the expected cost of the PMS. The amount of this contribution is depend on the
amount of the reliability that is gained in these swap scenarios and on the swap
cost. The amount of reliability gained by component swapping could be used to
determine which swap cost options is good in reducing the expected cost. These in-
dicators are useful in security assessment and risk management under the constraint
of cost. Further interesting topics for future research are different cost structures and
consideration of swapping, component standby, spares and maintenance activities.
Chapter 5
Concluding Remarks
In this thesis, we introduced the strategy of components swapping to enhance system
reliability and to make it more resilient to component failure. It is crucial that
this is a different activity than popular and well-studied approaches such as the
use of additional components to provide increased redundancy, the use of standby
components, maintenance activities, or increased component reliability [25, 33, 61,
71]. It is assumed that when a component fails, it can be swapped by another
one which is still functioning in order to enhance the reliability of the system. It
is further assumed that such a swap of components can be done only when the
system cannot function with the existing components in place. The quantification
of system reliability if some components can be swapped is introduced based on the
survival signature concept [18]. We considered component importance, which was
particularly simplified by the use of the survival signature.
It is likely to be attractive to consider a component swap, upon failure if this
activity can be done at low cost. In this thesis we also studied the cost effectiveness
of component swapping over a fixed period of time. The cost aspects is studied
under the assumption that a system would need to function for a given period of
time, where failure to achieve this incurs a penalty cost. The different swap scenarios
are compared with the option not to enable swaps, focusing on minimum expected
costs over the given period. We also examined the cost effectiveness of component
swapping over an unlimited time horizon from the perspective of renewal theory.
It is assumed that the system is entirely renewed upon failure, at a known cost.
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The expected cost per unit of time for the renewal system when there are different
swapping scenarios are compared with the option not to enable swaps, focusing on
minimum expected costs. We also discussed the meaningful effect that component
swapping might have on the preventive replacement actions.
A phased mission system (PMS) is one that performs several different tasks or
functions in sequence. In order to accomplish the mission successfully, the system
in every phase has to be completed without failure. Therefore, it is often difficult
for a PMS to work with high reliability. We extended the strategy of swapping
components upon failure that is introduced in Chapter 2 to improve the reliability
of PMS. In addition, we discussed another strategy of swapping components which
is swaping components according to structure importance. The survival signature
methodology that is introduced by [37] is used to analyse the effect of component
swapping according to both strategies on the reliability of the PMS. The scenario
when the swap between components is applicable at any time during the mission
is compared with the scenario when it is applicable only at transition of phases.
In this thesis we also studied the effectiveness of the cost of component swapping
in reducing the expected costs of the failure of PMS. The expected costs when the
two different scenarios of swapping possibilities are applicable are compared with
the option not to enable swaps, focusing on minimum expected costs over the given
period.
The increase in system reliability through such component swapping is new and
has not received much attention in the literature. The results show that the strategy
of swapping components upon failure can contribute significantly in improving the
reliability of a system and makes it resilient to possible faults. This strategy is quite
interesting since it will not increase the weight and volume of the system, it can
be used in the systems that are not easily accessible for repair and replacements, it
could enable preparation of substantial repair activities. In addition, in this strategy
the reliability and number of the components don’t need to be increased to improve
the reliability of the system. Although an upfront cost needs to be paid to enable
each swapping opportunity, this cost can contribute effectively in reducing the cost
associated with system failure. The cost modules that are derived in this thesis are
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useful in security assessment and risk management under the constraint of cost.
The approach of component swapping can be applied to improve the reliability of
many real systems. Real applications can include the following examples. Aerospace
systems with multiple computers on board, where some computers tasked with minor
functions can be prepared to take over crucial functions in case another computer
fails. Lighting systems, where multiple locations must be provided with light under
contract but where partial lighting at any location may be sufficient to meet the
contractual requirements. Transport systems, where parts of one mode of transport
can be used to keep another one running. Organizations, where employees can be
trained to take over some functioning of others in case of unexpected absence.
A further interesting topic for future research is the possibility to swap com-
ponents of different types and the possibility to swap components when they are
all still functioning. This could be attractive if one has the opportunity to swap
components of different types where a critical component may, while still function-
ing, be swapped with another component at a certain time if they have different
hazard rates over time. For example, a component with increasing hazard rate may
be best to use in a critical part of the system in early stages, to then be swapped
by a component with decreasing hazard rate to improve system reliability at later
stages. Further research also is to study the contribution that swaps can make to
system resilience in comparison to other activities, including more in-built redun-
dancy, standby components,or maintenance and replacement activities [64]. It could
also consider other importance measures. All the introduced research topics might
be considered for PMS.
The effect of the swapping of components in this thesis is entirely reflected
through the change in the survival signature. It may be of interest to investigate
whether or not this change can also be reflected by a distortion of the component re-
liabilities [59], which may provide a further tool for comparison of different systems
and different swapping routines. It has been shown that very efficient simulation
methods can be based on the survival signature [49]. The same simulation method
can perhaps also be used to only learn about difference in reliability for two swapping
regimes.
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It may be of interest also for future research to investigate different cost struc-
tures and consideration of choice between swapping components, standby, spares
and maintenance activities based on corresponding costs. It may also consider the
possibility to combine componets swapping with inspection models [10].
The approach presented in this thesis requires repeated calculation of survival
signatures. Aslett [6] has created a function in the statistical software R to compute
the survival signature, given a graphical presentation of the system structure. This
will be necessary for our work for systems that are not very small, and it will be of
interest to create a tool that can automatically compute all the survival signatures
required in case of a substantial system with many component swapping oppor-
tunities. It will be of interest also if this could be created for PMS in which the
calculation of survival signatures is more complicated.
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